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ABSTRACT 
This practice-led research project investigates the relationships between human and 
technological actors in theatre. More specifically, it examines the practical and 
philosophical implications of using technological objects as performers alongside 
human actors on stage with specific reference to theatrical presence. I pay particular 
attention to Cormac Power’s account of theatrical presence, and his distinctions 
between fictional, literal and auratic presence in order to identify the problems 
theatre practitioners encounter in the nascent genre of cyborg theatre.  
Jennifer Parker-Starbuck’s categories of subject/object and abject technology and her 
analysis of cyborg theatre informed much of my preliminary research. David Saltz’s 
definition of live media has also informed this work, and I have generated the 
questions that drive the research from my work as a theatre maker involved with 
human and technological actors over a period of fifteen years.  
There is a relative paucity of scholarship on the actor’s relationship with 
‘performing’ technologies, and this project addresses this gap in knowledge from the 
point of view of the director and human actor. The research proposes to advance 
knowledge in the fields of directing and theatre making by putting forward new 
strategies for directing actors who perform with computer-based technologies, 
which I define as those technologies that also function as actors with varying 
degrees of agency and autonomy.  
While my conclusions are based on my experience of working with technological 
actors in a variety of productions, which I refer to in the body of this exegesis, my 
examination performance, Cyborg No Exit, dramatises the ways that common 
assumptions about theatrical presence are disturbed by various screen and robotic 
technologies. This exegesis situates my examination performance within the field of 
cyborg theatre, analyses my creative process as a director and performer, and 
proffers an account of how technological actors unsettle conventional 
understandings of theatrical presence when performing with human actors.  
Finally, this exegesis predominantly substantiates the discovery that directing 
cyborg theatre requires an awareness of how actors are challenged by working with 
new technologies in practical and emotional terms. This process demands the 
formulation of specific dramaturgical principles that I enumerate in the chapters to 
come. The following areas are advanced through the exegesis: 
1) Cyborg theatre is in its earliest stages of formation, and current technologies 
lack the sophistication to produce a genuinely autonomous and spontaneous 
technological performer. 
2) The use of digital technologies in contemporary theatre exposes the complex 
interplay between different forms of presence in our everyday lives, which 
are increasingly characterised by our reliance on these technologies. In other 
words, our experience of space and time is altered by our interaction with 
mobile technologies that can make our everyday interlocutors literally present 
with one another: present on the phone as a voice; present as a disembodied 
consciousness in email; or as a spatially remote yet temporally present image 
on Skype, for example. Given this state of affairs, cyborg theatre provides a 
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space for unpacking the implications of living with digital technologies in art 
and life. 
3) The challenges posed by cyborg theatre for creative practice can be profitably 
explored through practice. In fact, my experience of directing and 
interviewing actors convinced me of the necessity to have an embodied 
experience of working with technologies myself in order to better understand 
how the actor’s energy and presence are affected by cyborg technologies in 
performance. 
Moreover, as a creative artist, I wanted to both communicate my research findings in 
a creative medium and to foreground the crucial relationship between bodies and 
technologies in cyborg theatre. This exegesis, then, provides an account of the 
investigations, analysis and problems that culminated in my performance of Cyborg 
No Exit. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This exegesis seeks to find directorial strategies for making cyborg theatre that 
combine human and technological actors. Such strategies are required in this nascent 
area of theatre making because of the impact that technological actors have on 
human actors’ presence. In order to find these strategies, the study explores how to 
animate the presence of non-human actors, how to facilitate human and 
technological actor interactivity in rehearsals and performances, how to deal with 
the lack of spontaneity that the programming of technological actors brings to the 
process of rehearsal and performance. Although this project could have focused on 
any number of secondary questions – from training, to rehearsal, to actor-audience 
relationships – the emphasis is to find strategies for directing human and 
technological actors in cyborg theatre works.   
My Practice 
I am a practicing artist, a theatre director with almost 20 years experience. I first 
incorporated pre-recorded video characters with live actors in a 2003 production 
Love, Madness and Poetry, at the York Theatre, Seymour Centre in Sydney. In these 
early explorations I realised that the juxtaposition of humans with non-human actors 
challenged the human actors’ presence and undermined the fictional world of the 
play. As a director it became obvious that new strategies for directing would be 
required to create theatre with both technological and human actors without 
undermining presence.  
The questions explored in this study first emerged for me when I began work on 
Exception in 2006, a production with one actor and various live-operated avatars 
from Second Life. The particular issues I encountered in creating Exception led me to 
undertake a year-long Mixed Reality Performance Lab (MRPL) in 2012 with a 
robotics centre and the Deakin motion capture lab to create two technological actors 
– a robot and avatar – and present a 20-minute scene – the last scene – from Ibsen’s 
Ghosts. These projects clearly raised questions around how technological objects can 
perform in a fictional world. During this MRPL I realised that much of what I was 
investigating was known in puppetry, which led me to undertake both a scholarly 
and practical investigation into that form.  
Cyborg No Exit was an examinable practice work that brought together all my 
previous testing in the making of cyborg theatre works and allowed me to examine 
and test various directorial strategies. The work also functioned as a commentary on 
current discussions of actor and technology in theatre. 
 
Methods 
This exegesis contextualises my performance work, Cyborg No Exit.  Cyborg No Exit, 
is a creative form of research that has lead to research insights around my key 
concern – directorial strategies for cyborg theatre that combine human and 
technological actors.Supporting this research is my ongoing investigation as an 
artist into technologies’ usage in theatrical performance. As a creative artist my 
default mode of inquiry lies in practical explorations with other theatre artists, 
which rely on ‘expert-intuition’ and ‘disciplined unknowing’ (Melrose). Melrose 
uses these terms to describe the different ways of knowing that an expert 
practitioner employs when making work. She identifies intuition as key to expert 
practitioners’ modes of knowledge making and states that this should be recognised 
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as theoretical practice alongside more traditional notions of writing theory. Expert-
intuition cannot be witnessed by expert-spectators, making it difficult to incorporate 
into the academy as valid knowledge. Melrose writes that: “’expert-intuitive 
operations’ play a significant and indeed exemplary role in (expert or professional) 
performance-making” (Melrose). Practice is also characterised by ‘disciplined 
unknowing’, which makes writing about the process of knowledge making quite 
difficult. Through my exegesis I have sought ways to articulate knowledge that I 
have gained intuitively through practical work.  
The novelty of my work lies in producing a practice-based dramaturgy that is 
sensitive to the nuances and complexities of how theatrical presence must be re-
thought with reference to technologies that act with humans. Through this study, I 
have gained a large amount of practical knowledge about working with technology 
by making work, by interviewing other practitioners and interviewing the actors 
with whom I have worked. This exegesis and Cyborg No Exit present my discoveries, 
which I hope will be of use to other theatre practitioners grappling with the practical 
issues of integrating technological actors with human actors. I have also identified 
terms and concepts to be used to describe these theatre works, which will be useful 
for scholars writing about theatre productions that engage technology as actors.  
My work creates new knowledge from the practitioner’s perspective, articulating 
preliminary strategies for working with actors within technological settings – i.e., 
data projection, prerecorded voice and video, interactive technologies, and 3D 
technological objects – as useful knowledge for theatre practitioners. In Material 
Thinking, Paul Carter critiques “narrowly empiricist conceptions of research” saying 
that these have eliminated creativity (184). Carter puts forward an image of creative 
research “as a complex process of material, social and environmental handing over” 
(184). My research is the result of creative practice. As a practitioner it would be 
useless for me to divorce theory from the new knowledge I gain through practice. 
For this reason, theory and practice are intricately entwined in the outcomes of my 
research. As Carter puts it: 
The outcomes of creative research are, in this sense, offcuts or infinity. 
Bunching perceptions or grouping phenomena in new ways that are 
memorable, they provide the ‘prenotion’ that enables mediation between the 
immediately to hand (or local) and the otherwise ungraspable (the global) – 
the activity of material thinking. (184)  
In this study, I identify the investigations I have undertaken and the questions these 
works have raised. As a practitioner, I have taken theoretical work around cyborg 
theatre and made it my own through practice. I have grappled with the relationship 
between subject technologies and actors’ bodies over my entire career, and through 
this theory around cyborg theatre, have found a vocabulary with which to speak. 
The work is an open-ended inquiry into cyborg theatre’s implication for theatre and 
live performance, conducted through discourse analysis, a reflexive journal, in-depth 
interviews with practitioners, a practice performance and the establishment of a 
vocabulary centred around a certain kind of relationship between live performance 
and technology. My examination performance Cyborg No Exit has been a culmination 
of years of inquiry, which I presented in the form of a dramatic dialogue. 
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Technology 
After having directed a number of theatre works that integrate human and non-
human actors, I realised that new strategies needed to be found to effectively 
integrate the organic and technological.  
Theatre has always interacted with technology: from costumes, props and masks 
that facilitate the presentation of dramatic characters to stage machinery, lighting 
and sound technologies. Theatre across the world has consistently created 
performances that represent an interaction between the human and technology 
(Baugh 6). Actors have learnt to adapt to new technological innovations, but the pace 
of this development since the Industrial Revolution has accelerated rapidly 
influencing almost every aspect of our lives (Dingle 40).  
Throughout theatre history, each new technological development has unsettled 
verities about the function of the actor – that is, until theatre practice assimilates each 
innovation. Many scholars, including Giesekam and Baugh, have commented on the 
way new technologies have disturbed theatre’s foundational concept of 
actor/audience co-presence (Baugh 6; Giesekam 1).  
In some ways, it is possible to map theatre history in terms of technological 
innovation. The printing press, for example, enabled drama to be scripted and 
reproduced, thus giving primacy to the dramatic text and the playwright. The role of 
electric lighting in the development of theatre has been well noted. For example, 
Baugh notes:  
The new technologies of gaslight mantles and the electricity of the last 
decades of the century offered the well-made play the opportunity to explore 
in detail the furnishings and property filled world of the domestic interior. (5) 
These perfect living rooms and detailed, naturalistic performances required specific 
direction. Arguably the technology enabled the role of the director to eclipse that of 
the text. 
Today’s media-saturated technologically complex world has drastically modified 
our understanding of human existence itself. This does not mean, however, that the 
traditional actor/audience relationship no longer exists. Henry Jenkins has argued 
that while each old medium is forced to coexist with emerging media, old media 
have not been displaced; their functions and status have simply shifted: “Once a 
medium establishes itself as satisfying some core human demand, it continues to 
function within the larger system of communication options” (14). While many 
technologies have been integrated on stage to contribute to theatre’s aesthetic 
dynamic, technology can be used to do more than just enhance the dramatic worlds 
created by traditional theatre performances. 
Historically, practitioners have one of two responses to technological innovation in 
theatre: they either fear it or actively embrace it. To put it differently, there are those 
who believe technology contaminates the purity of theatre and those who believe it 
is crucial to the development of the art form. Giesekam, who describes these two 
camps as ‘contamination and remediation’ (1), quotes leading contemporary British 
media commentator Mark Lawson, who warns of the threat posed by the 
incorporation of video material in theatre productions: “recent British theatre has 
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suggested not so much a co-existence between stage and screen as the old red velvet 
theatre curtains being flapped in surrender” (1). Giesekam begins with an analysis of 
the opposing attitudes to the use of media in theatre, arguing that theatre’s liveness 
has not been threatened by media as has often been feared. Giesekam identifies 
tensions between advocates of ‘poor theatre’ (Jerzy Grotowski’s theory of stripping 
theatre back to the actor/spectator relationship) and champions of a theatre of 
spectacle, which he traces back to Aristotle’s view that ‘the organisation of a 
tragedy’s visual aspect’ was a matter for stage technicians, not the playwright, since 
tragedy should be able to achieve its purposes without the recourse to visual effects” 
(qtd. in Giesekam 5).  
While performance artists, avant-garde artists and Happenings have been more 
likely than dramatic theatre to incorporate media technology, these two opposing 
positions can also be found within more experimental genres. Gunter Berghaus 
defines the anti-theatrical point of view as a form of ‘technophilia’ that propagates 
‘primitivism’ in performance (74-6).  
Walter Benjamin believed that the actor’s role in film was very different to that in 
theatre, and in some ways these differences are what account for the diverging 
positions on the place of technology in theatre. For Benjamin, theatre is: 
the artistic performance of a stage actor … presented to the public by the actor 
in person; that of the screen actor, however, is presented by a camera, with a 
twofold consequence. The camera that presents the performance of the film 
actor to the public need not respect the performance as an integral whole…the 
performance of the actor is subjected to a series of optical tests…Also, the film 
actor lacks the opportunity of the stage actor to adjust to the audience. (9-10)  
Those who fear that technology contaminates theatre argue for an unmediated 
relationship to the live, whereas those who argue for a re-mediated experience crave 
the layering that technology provides.  
Cyborg Theatre and Subject Technology 
As various digital technologies increasingly become integral to everyday life, the 
question of the human body’s relationship to technology becomes more important. 
In many ways this question can be answered by engaging with Jennifer Parker-
Starbuck’s proposal that incorporating subject technology in theatre enables a 
cyborg theatre to emerge – one in which the actor’s liveness and the performance’s 
logic are enhanced rather than diminished. I have engaged with Parker-Starbuck’s 
use of the term cyborg theatre rather than Gabriella Giannachi’s discussion of the 
same term in her book Virtual Theatre (2004) for two reasons. Firstly my introduction 
to the term was via Parker-Starbuck’s PhD dissertation which was published prior to 
Giannachi’s book; and secondly I find Parker-Starbuck’s concept of subject, object 
and abject technology intersecting with subject, object and abject bodies to be very 
useful when considering human and non-human actors on stage. Parker-Starbuck’s 
concept of subject technology is one I respond to as it describes technology with 
agency.  
Cyborg theatre…emerges at a historical moment of negotiation with 
technologies on stage as subject (original emphasis). Technology as simple as 
 12
a live video feed can become subject. Some of the artists within this study 
may at first glance seem to be using a form of object technology – the video 
monitor or television screen features prominently in the development of 
multimedia practice – however, as it gains agency and centrality, becoming an 
integral component of the work merging with bodies on stage, the role of 
technology shifts into subject to define the cyborg theatre form. (Cyborg 
Theatre 2011 50) 
Parker-Starbuck’s cyborg theatre is predominantly a metaphoric taxonomy. The 
metaphoric cyborg is of most interest to my study and hence I have avoided 
reference to more literal cyborgs that can be found in the work of Stelarc, which 
incorporates prosthetic devices, electrodes and other technologies as literal 
extensions of his own body in works such as Muscle Machine or Ear on Arm, or 
ORLAN who has worked extensively with plastic surgery selling photographs of her 
physical transformations to subsidise her other artworks (she had her forehead 
operated on to look like Mona Lisa and her chin altered to mirror Botticelli’s Venus).1  
For Parker-Starbuck, subject technology “often takes the form of digital technologies: 
for example digitally produced actor-figures who can interact with human actors. 
Subject technology carries its own weight on stage” (Cyborg Theatre 2003 29). Subject 
technology is not like other technology in that its removal causes the work to be 
incomplete. It functions in the same way as the performers do in that it is integral to 
the production. Subject technology is not merely a component of scenography, but 
an essential element of the performance: an element that questions traditional ideas 
about the actor’s presence which are articulated by many twentieth century theatre 
practitioners, and which I will compare in chapter two and unpack in more detail in 
subsequent chapters. 
Subject technology is a form of technology that ‘acts’ in ways similar to human 
actors; therefore, technology’s relationship to the human body is a critical aspect of 
cyborg theatre. Projection is a technology that often performs in theatre and its 
relationship to the human body can take many forms. André Bazin once said, “It is 
false to say that the screen is incapable of putting us ‘in the presence’ of the actor. It 
does so in the same way as a mirror – one must agree that the mirror relays the 
presence of the person reflected in it – but it is a mirror with a delayed reflection” 
(97). The screen makes the human body present in a very different manner to the live 
human body. It can reproduce, heighten, overwhelm or enhance the human body, as 
we will see in my discussion of Cyborg No Exit in later chapters.  
Parker-Starbuck models the body/technology relationship in Cyborg theatre on 
DNA, describing each of the two thick strands as body and technology “twisting in a 
dance of mutual dependency” (Cyborg Theatre 2011 37):  
 
The DNA double helix is a code, or blueprint, containing the genetic 
information that controls a cell’s activity, defining the unique individual; it is 
made up of two strands of nucleotides connected through linking bases. The 
body and technology strands of cyborg theatre are, like the nucleotides, the 

1 See www.stelarc.org or www.orlan.eu  
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broad strokes, comprised of conceptual components that, when linked, 
produce differing representations of the corporeal relationship to the 
technology. (Cyborg Theatre 2011 37)
Fig 1 Parker-Starbuck’s model of cyborg theatre using the double helix. “The cyborg theatre’s mutating 
double helix.” (Cyborg Theatre 2011 38). 
This model (in figure above) determines the following: 
Upper section: a weak link between body and technology that does not challenge the 
dominance of the liberal human subject. 
Middle section: cyborg performance where each strand is composed of smaller 
strands – abject, object, and subject – “concepts which can be applied to both bodies 
and technology, and which have long and often problematic historical resonances” 
(Parker-Starbuck, Cyborg Theatre 2011 39). Each of these strands develops its own 
relationship to subject technology.  
Lower section: Major examples of cyborg theatre where the relationship between 
body and technology is strongest – “helping us to imagine and create new cyborg 
subjectivities” (Parker-Starbuck, Cyborg Theatre 2011 39).  
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Cyborg theatre is processual, “becoming” through its integrations; it 
illuminates and projects bodies as they shape-shift through current trends, 
transforming them into potential entities that combat and highlight fixed 
notions of what “human” can mean in relationship to embodied technology 
(that is, in explicit relation to technologies, a luxury still not afforded to all 
bodies). Each of the couplings imagines different potentials and questions 
raised by the convergences of the body and what I argue is a subject 
technology. (Parker-Starbuck, Cyborg Theatre 2011 39) 
Parker-Starbuck’s analysis focuses on the intersection between subject technologies 
and each of the three bodies – abject, object and subject. She describes abject bodies 
as a puppet, an animal or a disabled body, bodies where their meaning is “societally 
abjected” (Cyborg Theatre 2011 45). Object bodies are other to the subject, the 
feminised or racialised other (45); and subject bodies “have historically been 
conceived with control and authority” (46).  
Subject technologies affect the relationship between actors, audiences, makers and 
content in theatre.2 Of course, subject technology in live performance also has 
implications for the corporeality and materiality of the human body.3 Parker-
Starbuck has conceptualised cyborg theatre as a theoretical construct to describe the 
integration of live bodies and technology on stage. In her 2003 dissertation Cyborg 
Theatre: Corporeal/Technological Intersections in Multimedia, she indicates that cyborg 
theatre raises issues of presence, and further questions the borders of performance. 
Her analysis traces the history of the concept ‘cyborg’ and situates her ‘cyborg 
theatre’ within this tradition. Parker-Starbuck is interested in how technology has 
moved closer and closer to the body, in the ways it impacts on the body, and in how 
technology and the body merge through the cyborg, destabilising binaries such as 
body/technology, global/local or able/disabled.  
Cyborg theatre uses existing and emerging technology not purely as a frame 
or aesthetic scenic backdrop for projected images, but as a mutually 
dependent component of a larger complex of social, political, and theatrical 
systems existing between the live and the technological. (Parker-Starbuck, 
Cyborg Theatre 2003 21) 
Donna Haraway, in her influential 1991 essay “A Cyborg Manifesto”, calls a cyborg 
“a cybernetic organism, a hybrid machine and organism, a creature of social reality 
as well as a creature of fiction” (149). She identifies the relationship between 
contemporary science fiction, medicine, and modern warfare, which are all full of 
cyborgs – “creatures simultaneously animal and machine” (149). Haraway’s ‘cyborg 
myth’, as she calls it, is about boundaries that have been transgressed: “potent 
fusions and dangerous possibilities” (154). Parker-Starbuck similarly configures the 
cyborg as an entity that has overcome the boundaries between the organic and the 
mechanical: hence her term ‘cyborg theatre’.  

2 The word ‘theatre’ can include many forms such as dance and opera. Johannes Birringer, among others, has 
extensively documented the use of the projected moving image with the dancer’s body, so the present work will 
not cover this ground. It is the speaking actor interacting with technology-as-actor that is under consideration. 
3 The technology that I will examine ranges from ‘heritage media’ such as film, video, and photographs to new 
media including animation, virtual reality, robotics and other digital, computer-based forms.   
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Directorial strategies  
Subject technology describes technology with agency on stage, technology as actor. 
A technological actor does not take direction in the same way that a human actor 
does. Directing a technological actor therefore requires new strategies, which greatly 
alter the traditional process of theatre making. This can become frustrating and 
overwhelming for human actors when co-acting with technology if they are not 
aware of the limitations and implications of technological actors. Not only will their 
performances be affected, but the entire rehearsal process and actor/director 
relationship will be different to a process of theatremaking that involves only 
humans. In the same way that working together with animals and human actors, or 
puppets and human actors requires a different process and different directorial 
strategies, working with technological actors requires, in many ways, an entire 
rethinking of theatre making. This leap occurs once the technology is used as subject, 
as actor, and does not apply in the same way if technology is used as set or prop. For 
a human actor who has developed their career working with other human actors, it 
can seem unnecessary for them to perform with technological actors. What value 
does technology bring to the stage for them as human actors? In the first instance, 
cyborg theatre can appear to diminish the human actors’ role and overwhelm it. 
However working with technological and human actors for some time now, I have 
come to see that the potential to animate the human actors’ presence by juxtaposing 
their performance with technological actors is significant. This requires new 
strategies for interacting with technological actors that do not reveal themselves 
immediately to human actors in rehearsal.  
One of the key questions that emerged for me as a director working with 
technological actors was whether the technology was an actor because of its actual 
capacity to perform live without human agency, or just because of its apparent 
capacity to do this. It became evident quite quickly that giving the impression of a 
live technological actor required the human actors’ involvement. In turn, the human 
actors required the technology to have a certain ‘liveness’ to be able to endow them 
with presence. In a 2001 article, David Saltz described the role of interactive media in 
dramatic theatre, where actors interact with media operated live. He argued that the 
use of such technology enables “dynamic new possibilities for theatre artists”, and 
questions our most basic assumptions about theatre and liveness (109). Saltz’s 
argument is that the value of live theatre in a mediatised age lies in its variability. He 
uses presence arguments to posit theatre’s appeal as an art form of “the spontaneous 
give and take between performers and spectators” (109). For Saltz, linear media – 
that is pre-recorded media: 
forces the live actor to conform rigorously to it. Such a performance contains 
the worst of both theatre and media: it lends the live performance a canned 
quality without endowing it with any of film or video’s advantages, such as 
the ability to select the best takes, edit out the mistakes, or apply camera 
movement or jump cuts to the live actor’s performance. (109)  
While I initially shared this view, and many actors I have worked with share this 
view, I now do not believe that it is a given that technology must be live for human 
actors to maintain their human presence when performing with technology. I do 
however believe that a very clear understanding of the limitations of technology as 
actor are required by all and strategies to make theatre that acknowledges these 
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limitations is required so that the “spontaneous give and take between performers 
and spectators” can still occur (Saltz 109).  
In the work that follows, and in order to discuss human and non-human actors, I 
differentiate the following three types of performing technologies: 
1) Technological puppets, where the technology is operated by human agency;  
2) Technological performers, where the technology has autonomous agency but does 
not purport to signify anything other than itself; and  
3) Technological actors, where the technology is separate from human agency and 
makes autonomous choices.  
Liveness and performance 
The very presence of a technological actor in theatre alters its dynamic and positions 
it within what Hans-Thies Lehman has described as postdramatic theatre. Lehmann 
sees the “spread and then omnipresence of the media in everyday life since the 
1970s” as having brought this about (22). Although he acknowledges that the 
“theatre revolution that occurred around the turn of the twentieth century 
historically paved the way”, he firmly positions the ‘rupture’ as contemporary (23). I 
share Brecht’s view though, that dramatic theatre was ruptured much earlier with 
the arrival of film. 			
nineteenth-century theatre became a 
showground for each new industrial innovation – including advances in lighting, 
clothes dyes, and household products (Baugh 4-5) – but it was in fact the emergence 
of cinema that really changed our relationship to life and reality and theatre. 
Manovich, for example, recognises cinema as one of the most significant 
developments in recent human history (6).  
The ability to record the moving form forced theatre, amongst other things, to 
articulate its difference from the new medium. Theatre identified its point of 
difference as being a site of “liveness”, in binary opposition to the mediatised. In 
Liveness: Performance in a Mediatized World, Phillip Auslander has argued that prior to 
radio and motion picture technologies, “there was no such thing as ‘live’ 
performance, for that category has meaning only in relation to an opposing 
possibility” (51). Auslander proposed the diminishing of the live and defined ‘live’ 
in relation to the mediatised. Without the mediatised image our concept of live could 
not exist. We have only grown to understand ‘liveness’ because we have developed 
a mediatised capability. However many, such asChapple and Kattenbelt and Dixon 
to name just a few, have contested this thesis. The debate between Peggy Phelan and 
Auslander regarding the nature of liveness is well known. Phelan argues that 
performance cannot be reproduced because it deteriorates as it occurs. In Unmarked 
(1993), she claims that performance “…plunges into visibility – in a maniacally 
charged present – and disappears into memory, into the realm of invisibility and the 
unconscious where it eludes regulation and control” (148).  Matthew Causey finds 
both Auslander and Phelan’s arguments to be problematic.  
Phelan disregards any effect of technology on performance and draws a non-
negotiable, essentialist border between the two media. Auslander draws out a 
sophisticated legal argument whose dynamic materialism overlooks the most 
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material manner of marking the live, namely death. Disputing the argument 
of Phelan and amending Auslander's I suggest that the ontology of 
performance (liveness), which exists before and after mediatization, has been 
altered within the space of technology. (“The Screen Test” 383) 
Though liveness is a contested concept I will use it throughout this study 
acknowledging that within my use of it, I draw on all of its various definitions.  
With the advent of performance studies and the differentiation between 
performance and theatre, drama and theatricality, as well as the development of 
performance art and performance installation, it is not surprising that the craft of 
theatre has been challenged and new terms are needed to describe works that do not 
conform to theatre as we have known it. Marvin Carlson describes performance and 
performance art as “a new genre in the art and theatre world” that “placed its 
emphasis upon the present body instead of on the absent text of traditional theatre” 
(83). I will discuss this in more detail in chapter one but here simply note that the 
juxtaposition of technology and the human, by its nature, places emphasis on the 
human body, therefore situating it firmly within the domain of performance.  
The concept of postdramatic theatre contains a deliberate objective to challenge and 
question dramatic theatre, as Lehman puts it: “the unfolding and blossoming of a 
potential of disintegration, dismantling and deconstruction within drama itself” (44). 
While use of technogical actors in theatre could have this objective, it is not 
necessarily the case. As a director, I am formically interested to integrate 
technological and human actors and not challenge dramatic theatre therefore I 
describe cyborg theatre as performance and not as postdramatic. I do however use 
Lehman’s term ‘dramatic dynamic’ to describe a key feature of dramatic theatre, that 
which Lehman differentiates from the ‘scenic dynamic’ of postdramatic theatre. 
Lehman describes postdramatic theatre as a contemporary movement where many 
of the key elements of dramatic theatre have retreated, creating landscape works 
where states override actions and text is subordinate to all the other elements of a 
theatrical work. He notes that many ‘postdramatic theatre’ makers have come from 
the visual arts, and that this form is highly influenced by other art forms. In his book 
Postdramatic Theatre, Lehman uses Brecht’s term ‘Dramatic Theatre’ to describe “the 
core of European theatre tradition in modern times,” including Brecht’s own work 
(21). I will also use the term ‘dramatic theatre’ in this way.  
Chapple and Kattenbelt have argued that film has taken over theatre’s role as 
dramatic art and that it is imperative that theatre redefines itself as ‘the stage of 
intermediality’ (20). While I see great value in the term ‘intermedial theatre’ and 
agree that the works I describe here sit within this description, I will use the term 
‘cyborg theatre’ and seek to elaborate on that rather than the term ‘intermedial 
theatre’. As a theoretical construct, cyborg theatre is visually rich and provocative, 
which in itself could foster new work for artists.  I see it to be an apt description of 
both my practice performance Cyborg No Exit and the different registers I use 
throughout this exegesis – sometimes descriptive, sometimes theoretical, and 
sometimes personal.  
Literature review 
 18
Very little has been written about the experience of performers working with 
technological actors and methods of directing cyborg theatre works. Likewise, much 
has been written about puppetry and animating objects, but not about the challenges 
and considerations of making technological objects competent actors and the impact 
this has on human performers, especially in relation to actorly presence. While 
artists and scholars are becoming increasingly interested in digital performance and 
cyborg theatre, the scholarly writing in this area is almost exclusively presented 
from the point of view of what Susan Melrose calls the “expert spectator”.  
Examples of this include Greg Giesekam’s 2007 book Staging the Screen: The Use of 
Film and Video in Theatre, which provides a useful summary of the history of 
technology in theatre. Giesekam examines the work of Erwin Piscator, Josef Svoboda 
and more contemporary practitioners including the Wooster Group and the 
Builders’ Association. Others such as Gunter Berghaus look at the use of the 
projected moving image in avant-garde performance, while Johannes Birringer has 
developed a significant body of theoretical writing about performance in a 
mediatised culture, and most specifically on technology and science’s relationship to 
dance. Chris Salter’s book Entangled, Michael Rush’s New in Late 20th-Century Art 
and Steve Dixon’s Digital Performance: a History of New Media in Theater, Dance, 
Performance Art, and Installation are all significant studies. Matthew Causey has 
written extensively within the field, as has Marie-Laure Ryan and as mentioned 
Freda Chapple and Chiel Kattenbelt have been critical in development of the term 
‘intermediality’. 
 
Given the gap in knowledge around practitioners’ perspectives in this growing field 
of interest, I will now conduct an overview of various actors’ perspectives who have 
worked with technology in my own work. These perspectives have deeply informed 
the questions I ask in my research.  
Actors’ perspectives 
In Exception, (a case study of my own work elaborated on in chapter three), the 
physical presence and history of the human actor, Terry Yeboah, influenced the 
work. His experience of working with the technology and his reflections on some of 
its deficiencies are reminiscent of David Saltz’s observations mentioned above:  
As an actor you’d be in the middle of a scene and it’s a pretty intense story. 
It’s about a man who lives in jail and people have to free him from a cell. My 
father was a refugee … and I know how he felt, which is why I loved the 
script so much. It is about a life that I knew. I’d be in the middle of the scene 
and suddenly the internet would cut out because there‘d be so much 
technology at once. It kills you as an actor because you’d be in the middle of a 
scene which was heartfelt or in a place where you’re crying and to stop for 
another two hours … You don’t want to come back to it. It’s almost like doing 
five shows a day. Because you’ve already done so much and it hurts for the 
internet to just cut out. That was the only thing that was frustrating for me 
because it was too much emotion and I don’t think any actor needs to go 
through that. (Yeboah)  
Yeboah’s comments highlight a critical issue for actors working with technology as 
actor; they have very different and opposing needs. Actors need to reach into 
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themselves to find emotional truths, explore and discover from within whereas 
technological actors need to be precise, predictable and programmed externally. 
Maddy Newman, co-actor in my examined practice work Cyborg No Exit, put it like 
this: 
The performance of each of the technologies in the show … was delivered the 
same way every time, especially in the case of the pre-recorded video. During 
the beginning of the rehearsal process I began to get stuck: delivering my 
lines the same way, and not delving into what the character was actually 
saying, but rather basing my reaction off the technological performers I was 
working with. For human actors who work with impulses and spontaneity, 
this ‘pre-recorded’ nature of technological actors can prevent further 
explorations of scenes and stagnation occurs correspondingly. (Newman)  
If a performer cannot find impulses and spontaneity then there is a danger that their 
movements become, what choreographer Garry Stewart described to me as 
“…dumbed down and less powerful at the subservience of the technology. 
(Stewart). The possibility of dumbing down movement and performance is an issue 
performers face when performing with technological actors, which points to a kind 
of retraining of the body by the technology. My other co-performer in Cyborg No 
Exit, Magda Miranda, conveyed a very interesting anecdote that epitomises her 
experience of operating the robot vacuum. Miranda is primarily a performer, as 
opposed to an operator, but I wanted her to operate the vacuum as I felt it was vital 
that the operator should enter the robot’s role in the manner of a performer. She 
explained: 
On opening night you should have seen my hand – it was shaking because I 
was so scared of making a mistake. It’s different to being a performer because 
if you make a mistake, forget a line you can improvise or play but with the 
robot I felt I couldn’t. With the robot when he turned the wrong way, it would 
really show. Any little mistake could be a huge thing. There was one mistake 
that I made as an actor in the first show and I realised it was because I was 
thinking as the robot. When I entered the stage to do my thing with Maddy 
and she said, “Would you keep quiet please?” I was supposed to speak, and I 
didn’t. I just did the robot movement and she looked at me waiting and I 
thought, “Oh gosh, I forgot my lines.” But it’s because I was being the robot 
there, who doesn’t speak when he does that moment in the same scene. I was 
doing his movements and I completely forgot myself. I was on the stage but 
was doing his movement. (Miranda) 
 
Miranda’s overall experience of operating the vacuum was that she did not make the 
robot more human-like; rather, the robot made her more robotic. In this way the 
robotic technology was retraining her movement and her capacity as a performer. 
When I asked Newman what she felt was different about our rehearsal period and 
other theatre shows she has worked in, she said: 
In other shows…the initial rehearsals are spent building relationships of 
characters, interactions and ‘feeling’ your way through the script, dialogue 
and blocking. I have worked mostly employing the notion that if you don't 
feel like doing something  – i.e. saying a line, moving – then you do not do so 
until that feeling is present. During the rehearsals for this performance, 
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however, it was imperative to consolidate the blocking and general direction 
of the show first, in order for the technology to operate perfectly within it. 
Rather than finding my performance in those initial rehearsals, we found the 
technologies’ performance/programming; the human actor needed to 
discover theirs within a tightly formed framework. Subsequently the 
challenges that these parameters imposed allowed me to discover a different 
way of working. Rather than discovering the character through my dialogue 
and interactions with other characters in a malleable way, the blocking meant 
that my character could be discovered through my own body and thought 
processes, which allowed for a different kind of liberation for the actor. 
Having the actors aware of this difference in process, I also believe, is very 
useful to the actor. Aware that the process begins with blocking and ends in 
‘play’, means that the actor can construct their character development and 
understanding in a different way. (Newman) 
In all of these examples we find the auratic presence of the actor challenged; her 
training and capacity to work against “daily behaviour” or socially inscribed 
“personality” (Power 77) is compromised by the retraining that the technology 
requires. Actress Jing Xuan Chan who played Regine in my MRPL case study (also 
described in chapter three), reiterates Newman’s comments about needing to work 
in a different mode to what she has been accustomed in order to maintain her 
presence: 
There wasn’t much scope to change things from our point of view once we 
had programmed in what the robot was going to do. Even the rehearsal 
process was a bit reverse to what I’m used to. The rehearsal process wasn’t 
finding where we want to go. It was, “we know where we want to go: how do 
we make it work, and how do we make it a legitimate choice for us to walk 
here and be there when we say these things?” Also in terms of playing to the 
robot actor … its delivery and pathway was always exactly the same so we 
had to find a way not to be static even though the robot was. (Chan) 
If a trained actor is constantly interrupted in her process of creating a role because 
the technology requires it, then her capacity to prepare an auratic performance is 
undermined. For this reason directorial strategies and new rehearsal processes are 
required that can enable human actors to create a role and maintain or enhance their 
presence, while at the same time enabling technology to perform as actors. My 
exegesis explores this relationship and finally offers preliminary strategies to create 
cyborg theatre works that enhance the human actors’ auratic presence.  
Chapter Overview 
The implications of my study include new audience/performer relationships, re-
examined rehearsal processes and training methods and improved directorial 
processes for making cyborg theatre. Incorporating technologies into live 
performance as actors provides numerous possibilities for creative practice, yet 
relatively few studies exist to reveal what enables a cyborg theatre to emerge. This 
current study will benefit practitioners who choose to work with subject technology, 
by providing them with an analysis of the field and the boundaries that must be 
overcome to integrate live media with the human body. The cyborg is a being that 
has transgressed boundaries, yet in theatre we are still articulating what boundaries 
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exist between the live organic human actors and digital and mechanical subject 
technologies. By describing and examining these through the rejection or 
incorporation of cyborg practices, artists and audiences alike will be able to 
understand what constitutes a cyborg theatre.  
The following chapters seek to unpack links between form, bodies, genre and 
technology to answer artists’, students’ and theorists’ questions around the use of 
technology in theatre. By examining significant productions as well as analysing my 
own work, I hope to demonstrate that subject technology can emphasise the actor’s 
liveness and contribute to a production’s structural logic.  
In chapter one, I enumerate the qualities of an acting entity by surveying discourses 
of acting theory in relation to contemporary research on computer-based 
technologies. I compare these methods to performing animals and puppets to 
discuss the capacity of technology to simulate consciousness and emotional truth.  
In chapter two, I discuss the work of seminal productions that have used subject 
technology. Some of the material that appears in this chapter has been previously 
published in Australasian Drama Studies. Here, I take up Cormac Power’s modes of 
presence to examine four case studies that use digital technology. Furthermore, I 
investigate the impact of digital technologies in live performance on theatre’s claims 
to presence; I also investigate the indirect influence these technologies have on forms 
of fictional and auratic presence.  
In chapter three I will unpack the dichotomy between theory and practice in order to 
articulate practical outcomes. Chapter three unpacks two large-scale investigations I 
have undertaken, both of which used technology as co-actors: Exception and Robots, 
Avatars and Ghosts, the latter of which was part of the Mixed Reality Performance 
Lab (MRPL). In Exception, live-operated avatars from Second Life interacted with one 
actor on stage, and in Robots, Avatars and Ghosts, I worked with a custom-built robot 
and a motion capture-operated avatar inside a 3D stereoscopic set to present a 
segment of Ibsen’s Ghosts. The development of these works drove me to ask the 
specific questions addressed in this exegesis. 
 
Chapter four moves on to examine my practice-research presentation Cyborg No Exit 
in which I performed with a robot vacuum, pre-recorded and live video projections, 
as well as two other actors. I contextualise this discussion within modes of presence 
elaborated in earlier chapters, drawing on Russell Fewster’s notion of ‘four bodies’, 
which describes bodies’ relationship to technology, in order to present findings 
around the need for new directorial strategies for directors working with human and 
non human actors in cyborg theatre works.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
In this chapter I ask what constitutes technology as an ‘actor’ with reference to 
cyborg theatre. This raises fundamental questions about what it means to be an 
embodied human actor. It also necessitates an inquiry into the critical literature on 
the capacity of non-human entities such as animals, computer graphics and puppets 
to perform emotion. My guiding question requires an engagement with various 
theories of acting in order to identify the most important metaphysical assumptions 
about acting. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the question of what 
constitutes technology as an actor demands we unpack the concept of presence, 
which permeates Western theories of acting, and which I will address in detail in the 
next chapter. I will also refer to recent advances in artificial intelligence and 
intelligent systems research, since this body of research can challenge those theories 
of acting that are dependent on concepts of ‘consciousness’, ‘truth’ and conventional 
notions of presence.  
Traditional theories of acting themselves, though, have undergone significant 
revision over recent decades. In his introduction to Fischer-Lichte’s The 
Transformative Power of Performance, Marvin Carlson describes two different 
variations of performance studies that have evolved in the United States over the 
past century. The first privileges a practical and physical approach to theatre 
training, largely based on verbal interpretation and communication; the other is a 
more academic European approach to theatre, influenced by Max Herrmann in 
Germany, which is more concerned with the material conditions of performance 
such as the physical stage, scenery, and costumes, rather than with the body of the 
actor, which is perceived as only one element among many.  
Erika Fischer-Lichte identifies a ‘turn to performance’ that first took place in the 
early part of the twentieth century. In Germany, Herrmann advocated for 
performance – not literature – as the centre of theatre, and he argued for a new 
discipline called ‘theatre studies’ which would be almost in opposition to ‘drama’, 
the textual creation of a writer (Fischer-Lichte 30). Herrmann identified the 
relationship between audience and actors as the heart of performance: 
[The] original meaning of theatre refers to its conception as social play – 
played by all for all. A game in which everyone is a player – actors and 
spectators alike … The spectators are involved as co-players. In this sense the 
audience is the creator of the theatre. So many different participants constitute 
the theatrical event that its social nature cannot be lost. Theatre always 
produces a social community. (qtd. in Lichte 32) 
To Herrmann performance is about the physical co-presence of actors and 
spectators. In many ways this ‘turn to performance’ is a turn to bodily presence, 
where focus moves away from the fictive semiotic character to the real phenomenal 
body of the actor and the real space within which she performs.  
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Cyborg theatre blurs the line between human and machine, and is grounded in a 
“turn to performance”. This theatre is one that engages everyday technologies to 
play with humans on stage, to explore possible futures, contemporary realities and 
impossible dreams. It focuses on the impact of media technologies on the body. 
Parker-Starbuck is interested in ‘lives’ on stage and underscores the fact that cyborg 
theatre is about embodiment (Cyborg Theatre 2011 16). She cautions not to overlook 
the “specific conditions of bodies or embodiment – and the theatrical frames that 
insist upon bodily presence while desiring new technologies” (Cyborg Theatre 2011 
21). Cyborg theatre only emerges when “what has previously been considered solely 
tool, prosthetic extension of the body, or system begins to claim concepts of agency” 
(Cyborg Theatre 2011 40-41). Her central concern is to query technology’s dialogue 
with the body. Yet many traditional notions of acting and theatre see a dialogue with 
technology as a threat to theatre’s metaphysical potential.  
Theories of Human and Non-Human Acting 
It is the actors’ auratic presence (to be discussed in detail below) that comes into 
question when the body is juxtaposed with technology that has agency. As Eugenio 
Barba states in The Essence of Theatre, all founders of twentieth-century theatre 
traditions have sought “to transcend the performance as a physical and ephemeral 
manifestation, and attain a metaphysical dimension – political, social, didactic, 
therapeutic, ethical or spiritual” (17). It is through the actors’ aura that this 
metaphysical transcendence is hoped to occur. These practitioners have done this 
either by seeking to eradicate the text, as advocated by Artaud and Grotowski, or, 
like Stanislavski and Brecht, by defining ways for an actor to speak so all traces of 
the rehearsed dramatic text are masked. Stanislavski’s method was based on 
ensuring the actor’s thoughts are as connected to her speech as far as is possible. 
This goal requires immense skill, and we praise those actors that create the 
impression of spontaneity. In the essay “Just Be Yourself”, Philip Auslander 
critiques Stanislavski, Grotowski and Brecht, demonstrating that they “all assume 
that the actor’s self precedes and grounds her performance and that it is the presence 
of this self in performance that provides the audience with access to human 
truths”(60). 
Stanislavsky states that the actor’s self is the basis of performance, but his 
own working out of this idea leads him to posit that the self is produced by 
the process of acting. Brecht would have the actor partly withhold her 
presence from the character she plays in order to comment on it. To do so, 
however, the actor must endow another fictional persona with the authority 
of full presence … Grotowski proposes the actor’s body as an absolute 
presence which banishes difference, but does not take into account the action 
of difference within the body. (Auslander 65-66) 
Accounting for the persistent metaphysics of presence in theatre has become an 
important feature of recent performance theory. Elinor Fuchs demonstrates that 
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drama is a tradition of “writing that strives to create the illusion that it is composed 
of spontaneous speech, a form of writing that paradoxically seems to assert the claim 
of speech to be a direct conduit to Being”(163). Others, such as Roger Copeland, 
have questioned theatre’s claims to uniqueness based on the live presence of the 
actor (39). 
Two common themes emerge from examining traditional acting theories: the first 
concerns inner emotional truth, which creates an external form; and the second is a 
focus on an external form (through the body), which creates an internal truth. Most 
acting theories engage with the problem of how the actor conveys emotional truth to 
an audience. Stanislavski, for example, says: 
He [the actor] must fit his own human qualities to the life of this other person, 
and pour into it all of his own soul. The fundamental aim of our art is the 
creation of this inner life of a human spirit, and its expression in an artistic 
form. That is why we begin by thinking about the inner side of a role, and 
how to create its spiritual life through the help of the internal process of living 
the part. You must live it by actually experiencing feelings that are analogous 
to it, each and every time you repeat the process of creating it. (14-15)  
If we look at significant Western acting theories of the past century, each determines 
how an actor must create her role. This is usually articulated with reference to 
creation of character, the relationship between the actor as person and the theatrical 
role she must perform. Acting is traditionally about performing another or having a 
fictional relationship to another. In fact, a central tenet of dramatic theatre is the 
requirement of audiences to identify and empathise with fictional characters.  
One of the first actors is believed to have been an ancient Greek poet called Thespis 
of Icaria. The fourth-century Greek rhetorician Themistius quotes Aristotle in saying 
that ancient tragedy employed only a dithyrambic chorus until Thespis stepped out 
to introduce the prologue and the internal speeches. If this is true, Thespis innovated 
tragic dialogue when he interwove choral song with a character’s speeches, and 
exchanged words with the choragus, the leader of the chorus. In this way character 
was born, and subsequent definitions of acting are inextricably linked with the 
representation of character.  
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Table. 1 Western Acting Theories.4 
As the above table demonstrates, Western acting theories depend on a metaphysics 
of presence that assume the centrality of the human subject with reference to human 

4 This table was created with reference to Lutterbie. 
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emotions, human consciousness and questions of emotional truth. Clearly, non-
human actors do not necessarily possess consciousness and agency as articulated by 
canonical Western theories of acting. In order to understand the challenge that 
cyborg theatre poses for conventional approaches to acting it is useful to look at the 
scholarly literature on non-human performers. 
Performing Animals 
Peta Tait’s book Wild and Dangerous Performances deconstructs the human/non-
human binary with reference to animal performers in the circus. Tait describes how 
animals have been trained to represent emotions such as anger and playfulness 
through repeated pre-set movements. Big cats, for example, are trained to roar 
repetitively to appear ferocious when their roars are actually an expression of 
boredom and not aggression (Tait 39). Similarly, elephants are trained to appear as 
cute and loveable as clowns and ballerinas, despite their frequently ferocious 
offstage behaviour (Tait 8). Tait describes these performing modes as conforming to 
“a definition of performance as ‘the doing of actions for spectators’” (2). She 
describes the trainers as actors and the animals as performers: “Trainers constructed 
emotional dramas of confrontation or submission between human presenters and 
big cats or elephants” (2). Trainers would act nervously and fearfully to give 
audiences the impression of danger. These acts were designed to induce emotional 
responses in spectators by training animals to represent a simulation of human 
emotions. Although these animals are representing elements of character, they are 
not party to the construction of this representation; rather, they are merely repeating 
learned actions. Audiences marvel at the animals’ capacity to represent emotion; 
however, part of the appeal is the knowledge that the animal could assert its will at 
any moment during such an act.  
There are some interesting parallels to consider here regarding the capacity of 
animals and technologies to perform emotion. Both animals and subject technologies 
present only their own physicality, unlike an actor who signifies her literal presence 
and a fictional role. A key question pertinent to this study is whether a technology 
can be read as the sign of a character (and therefore ‘be an actor’) or whether 
spectators will always read such technologies in terms of their material 
characteristics. In most instances, human actors represent themselves as well as the 
character they play, whereas in most instances an animal or a technology plays itself.  
Computer-Based Actors 
Many of the terms used to describe acting, such as ‘body, spirit, and emotional 
truth’, are not useful when discussing technological objects/media and their 
capacity to act. In performing a character (and therefore ‘acting’) a technological 
object must simulate emotion. Interestingly, computer graphics, games developers, 
media theorists and computer and electronics researchers have all been using theatre 
metaphors to help them simulate human beings.  
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Researchers at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Media Lab have 
been developing software to use with “real-time computer-vision-based body 
tracking and gesture recognition techniques, to choreograph digital media together 
with human performers” (Sparacino et al. 479). In describing this software, they refer 
to it as ‘media actors software’, where ‘media objects’ – expressive texts, 
photographs, movie clips, audio and sound clips – are endowed with “coordinated 
perceptual intelligence, behaviours, personality and intentionality” (Sparacino et al. 
479). These media objects are able to respond to movement and gesture from 
performers and public in “believable, aesthetical and expressive” ways (Sparacino et 
al. 479).  
The point to note here is that what these researchers call ‘media actors’ are 
intentional systems that simulate the dynamics of a human encounter. The media 
actors’ ‘personalities’ affect their internal states (their feelings), their perception of 
the public’s behaviour (their intentions) and their expectations about future 
interactions with humans. They are media actors with a range of expressive 
behaviours that have lifelike responses. These responses are based on their capacity 
to select an appropriate reaction founded on a repertoire of expressive actions – the 
human opposite does not know what response she will get. There is a level of 
spontaneity and randomness here that mirrors a human’s capacity to react to 
external stimuli.  
In order to account for their media actors’ capabilities, the MIT researchers 
categorise five different systems of interactive media: scripted, responsive, learning, 
behavioural and intentional. It is within the intentional system that media actors are 
found. They are similar to autonomous agents. Autonomous agents or ‘lifelike 
characters’ are “software systems with a set of time-dependant goals or motivations 
that the agents try to satisfy in a complex dynamic environment (such as the real 
world)” (Sparacino et al. 480). An agent is autonomous when it can sense and 
interact within its environment and decide what actions to take to best achieve its 
goals.  
The concept of an ‘agent’ is a central approach to the field of artificial intelligence, 
described variously as ‘rational’, ‘intelligent’ or ‘autonomous’. According to Stuart 
Russell and Peter Norvig, “An agent is anything that can be viewed as perceiving its 
environment through sensors and acting upon that environment through actuators” 
(32). Human agents, they explain, have: 
eyes, ears and other organs for sensors and hands, legs, mouth and other 
body parts for actuators. A robotic agent might have cameras and infrared 
range finders for sensors and various motors for actuators. A software agent 
receives keystrokes, file contents and network packets as sensory inputs and 
acts on the environment by displaying on the screen, writing files and 
sending network packets. (32)  
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The term ‘percept’ is used to describe the agent’s perceptual inputs. Intentional 
systems, then, are a way of thinking about authoring interactive media: 
Sensor data are first interpreted by the system, as a “percept” and then 
mapped to an action selected by the behavior system. Both the interpretation 
and the behavioral mechanisms are influenced by the personality of the agent. 
The agent generates expectations of the public’s behavior and therefore 
“feels” frustrated or gratified by its experience with people. The intermediate 
layer of perceptions provides the agent with an interpretation of the 
interactor’s intentions and can be considered as a primitive ‘user model’ of 
the system. The intentional approach allows the system to simulate more 
closely the dynamics of a human encounter, such as the communication of 
emotion. (Sparacino et al. 483)  
One can see how the term ‘autonomous agent’ could be useful to define technology 
that acts or performs on stage. According to the MIT researchers’ definition of 
autonomy, the decision-making needs to be independent of a human agent. The 
system itself must be able to make decisions.  
The question of simulation is one with which artificial intelligence (AI) discourse has 
grappled for some time. There are two key hypotheses worth noting: the weak AI 
hypothesis is the assertion that machines can act intelligently, whereas the strong AI 
hypothesis is that machines that do so are actually thinking, as opposed to simulating 
thinking. Russell and Norvig suggest most AI researchers do not care whether the 
intelligence is simulated or real, as long as their program works (947). This comes 
back to my earlier question about technological actors and whether they need to be 
actually ‘acting’, performing live or just simulating liveness.  
Alan Turing’s famous Turing Test defined artificial intelligence as a test result 
indistinguishable from that of a human being: “A computer passes the test if a 
human interrogator, after posing some written questions, cannot tell whether the 
written responses come from a person or not” (Russell and Norvig 2). Norvig and 
Russell state that to pass the test, the computer would need to possess natural 
language processing, knowledge representation, automated reasoning and machine 
learning (3). While Turing’s test deliberately avoided physical interaction, the so-
called Total Turing Test would include a video signal so the interrogator could test 
the computer’s perceptual abilities. For this to happen, the computer would need 
computer vision to perceive objects and robotics in order to manipulate objects 
(Russell and Norvig 3). The Turing Test raises an important question for Cyborg 
Theatre. If the theatre audience cannot distinguish whether the subject 
media/technology is actually acting or just simulating acting through human 
operation, then for all intents and purposes is the media/technology acting, or not?  
The study of autonomous agents within computer science and electronic engineering 
has developed rapidly in the past decade. This research is primarily concerned with 
computer-generated characters that can live in virtual worlds and have their own 
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free will. These virtual characters are close simulations of living beings. Researchers 
into autonomous computer-generated behaviour are developing these techniques – 
as outlined above – to make these sorts of virtual characters not only seem lifelike, 
but also appear rich in terms of personality traits.  
Drawing on the language used by technologists, we can begin to describe technology 
that acts in theatre. These terms are more useful than those such as body, spirit, 
consciousness and truth, which are used in human acting theories. There are very 
few applications of technology in theatre, however, where the technology could be 
described as an ‘autonomous agent’: where it can interpret external data through a 
sensory system, generate an internal perception filtered by its own personality, and 
update its internal state based on this internal perception while selecting an 
appropriate action based on a repertoire of expressive behaviours.  
A rare example of technology as autonomous agent – which Masura defines as a 
non-human actor that takes on a life of its own where it not only interacts but also 
reacts (72) – is Susan Broadhurst’s Blue Bloodshot Flowers. Here ’Jeremiah’, a projected 
head that has some form of artificial intelligence, responds with what appear to be 
emotions portrayed by facial expressions, based on a dancer’s proximity. The media 
is a kind of ‘autonomous agent’, interpreting external data – the dancer’s proximity – 
through a sensory system. “Jeremiah consisted of computerised artificial intelligence 
with the ability to track humans, objects, and other stimuli and to react to what’s 
going on near him directly and in real time” (Broadhurst 143).  
Masura points out that the audience understood the AI head to be only the 
character, whereas the human performer was understood to be herself as well as the 
character she played (72). This fundamental difference emerges when attempting to 
correlate what the live performer does on stage and what the technology can achieve 
as co-actor. Broadhurst explains that Jeremiah could demonstrate random behaviour 
“that can be disruptive during a performance. The unpredictability adds a further 
‘real life’ dimension to working with a virtual being” (144). As Broadhurst describes, 
Jeremiah was ‘original’ “just as an improvising artist is original” (144) because every 
performance was unique. It is this level of random responsiveness and ‘liveness’ that 
I have explored through my own creative work. These themes of responsiveness and 
‘liveness’ in the technological actor’s relationship to the human are subsequently 
explored in my examination performance, Cyborg No Exit. Whether or not a 
technology needs to simulate liveness or is in fact live to be an effective technological 
actor was one of the key practice questions I explored through this work.  
The capacity for a technology to actually react in theatre is currently very rare. A 
‘puppeteered’ technology is more common than an autonomous decision-making 
agent. Technology is most often operated live and/or in real time by a human, and it 
does not ‘act’ but performs the simulated role of a ‘subject’ as a puppet might.  
Puppetry and Cyborg Theatre 
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Puppetry has used performing objects alongside humans for many centuries. There 
is a long tradition in Western philosophy of comparing humans with puppets in 
order to identify what is unique about human consciousness and conceptions of self 
with reference to the body. In other words, puppets have often been used to help us 
understand our own subjectivity. Moreover, they have served as metaphorical 
analogues of humans since Plato used them to articulate a paradigm of 
representation in his allegory of the cave (Shershow 15).  
In her introduction to A Barthes Reader, Susan Sontag compares two key texts that 
focus on the philosophical significance of puppets: Barthes’ structuralist reading of 
Bunraku puppetry (in “Lesson in Writing”) and Kleist’s romantic notion of the 
marionette (in his 1810 essay “On the Marionette Theater”). For Sontag, both these 
texts celebrate “the tranquillity, lightness, and grace of beings free of thinking, of 
meaning – free of ‘the disorders of consciousness’” (xxv).  
 
Like the puppets in Kleist’s essay, the Bunraku puppets are seen as an incarnation of 
an ideal “impassivity, clarity, agility, subtlety” (Sontag xxv). In Kleist’s essay, he 
remembers a puppet show he once saw and recounts that he was asked by a dancer 
if he found the puppets to be graceful. He responds that he did find the puppets to 
possess a certain grace. Through the parable of a young man who imitated a Greek 
statue without meaning to, and a bear that sent up its master’s movements also 
without intention, Kleist outlines the grace that comes with a pre-conscious state: a 
grace that disappears once consciousness arrives. Thus the puppet, without 
consciousness, has grace.  
 
But the Bunraku puppets that Barthes’ describes in “Lessons on Writing” are not 
depicted as being pre-conscious innocents. Rather, Barthes argues that they achieve 
their grace through other means. Barthes claims that the Western puppet to which 
Kleist refers holds up a mirror to the actor in order to show its humiliation, “the 
abjectness of its inertia” (qtd in Sontag 306). Kleist’s dancer, on the other hand, refers 
to the puppets as not being “afflicted by the inertia of matter” – they are weightless, 
not held down by gravity, the way in which a dancer is (Kleist 24).  
 
Influenced by Kleist’s essay, Edward Gordon Craig famously declared that actors 
should be replaced by ‘Über-Marionettes’ that would be able to perfect life “a death 
like beauty while exhaling a living spirit” (84-85). Craig felt that humans were 
limited by their own emotions and personality. Echoing Craig, Japanese theatre 
director Oriza Hirata has often been quoted as saying that the android is the perfect 
actor. I will describe his work Sayonara in the next chapter but Hirata’s relationship 
to the actor is relevant here. Hirata is interested in limiting his actors to the freedom 
of interior space, giving them little or no subjective choice (Hirata). For a number of 
reasons, one could consider that Hirata uses actors as puppets by limiting their 
freedom of choice and by making the actor appear as the animator of a world.  
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A technological object’s lack of self-consciousness, like the puppet’s, leaves it open to 
become a vessel for human consciousness to inhabit. An audience can project their 
own perceptions onto a technological object. During an interview I conducted with 
Australian Dance Theatre’s Artistic Director, Garry Stewart, he described the robotic 
machines used in his 2006 production, Devolution: 
Louis-Philippe’s Demers, [the roboticist’s] whole position was that function 
and notion was based upon our consciousness of the viewer and what we 
transposed onto the robotics. And that was absolutely the case. It was a 
dialogue but the whole context that the robots were perceived within was 
through the consciousness that the audience was empathising and projecting 
onto the robots. (Stewart) 
In this work, 30 robotic machines and prosthetics interacted with dancers.  
They had a massive presence. I thought of them as performers and what is 
really interesting is that over a period of time I started feeling a sense of 
emotional connection to the robots and if something went wrong with one of 
them and had to be fixed there was a certain empathy and when they came on 
stage there was a particular emotional feeling for each one, different from one 
to the other. (Stewart)  
Stewart put this down to the fact that any object that moves through space as if 
autonomously is invested with consciousness: “We can’t help it. We empathise with 
it” (Stewart). It is interesting to contemplate how an object that does not experience 
emotion could convey emotion. How do we empathise with inanimate objects? 
Misselhorn explains in her article “Empathy with Inanimate Objects” that empathy 
is often characterised as the ability to “put oneself in another’s shoes”, which we can 
do by seeing the facial expression or tone of voice of someone experiencing an 
emotion (7).  
An object which does not display a great number of human-like features, but 
very typical and salient ones, might do better in terms of perception-based 
empathy than an object that shares a great number of human-like even typical 
features which are not salient. (Misselhorn 12)  
Misselhorn suggests that imagination must be involved in the emergence of 
empathy with inanimate objects: “It is the perception of an inanimate object that 
produces empathy in us, and not pretending of its being human” (8). This can be the 
case for objects, puppets or digital graphics.   
In Digital Performance, Steve Dixon describes ‘puppet doubles’ as computer-
generated bodies where software applications manipulate puppet-like graphical 
figures mainly using live dancers (266). What is most interesting here is a description 
of ‘digital puppets’, which Dixon states are based on principles from theatrical 
puppetry (267). He concludes by saying: 
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Artaud’s call for the use of giant stage mannequins in The Theatre and Its 
Double have thus been answered in myriad ways within digital performance, 
from avatars and robots to virtual dancers, to the reduction of the live human 
body itself to a puppet, manipulated by audiences at a distance. The 
manipulable mannequin acts as a design tool, for conceiving performance in 
virtual form prior to work with human performers, as an avatar or Über-
marionette replacement for the live performer, or as the performer herself, at 
the mercy of digital manipulations (original emphasis). (268)  
In The Family Factory, a 2002 performance created by artists at the Interactive 
Institute in Malmö, Sweden, experienced puppeteers controlled avatars so they were 
as lifelike as possible, in the hope that the avatars’ behaviour would have “a depth of 
character/personality and social and emotional verisimilitude that is currently 
extremely difficult, if not impossible, using computer technologies alone” (Dixon 
268). The artist behind The Family Factory, Jørgen Callesen, refers to his work as 
“performance animation” to describe the artistic application of motion capture for 
real-time 3D animation (“The Family Factory” 149). The Family Factory formed part 
of Callesen’s PhD and during his research he began to look at agents – which he 
defines as virtual characters – as actors, but he explains, “it soon became obvious … 
that by seeing ‘agents as puppets’ … you can get a broader understanding of the 
meaning of the relation between player and the puppet in this case the ‘agent’ on the 
screen” (“The Family Factory” 150). What Callesen and his colleagues discovered 
was that the presence of a puppeteer operating the virtual puppet allowed it to have 
more realistic and spontaneous movement possibilities. 
Stephen Kaplin first put forward the concept of the virtual puppet in 1994 in the 
inaugural Puppetry International Journal, where he suggested that virtual characters in 
projections are puppets made out of a special material: light on a screen. Steve Tillis 
further developed Kaplin’s discussion of virtual puppets in a 1999 article “The Art of 
Puppetry in the Age of Media Production”. Tillis describes characters created 
through computer graphics as ‘media figures’, which he defines as “figures whose 
performance is made possible through technological mediation as well as 
animatronic figures” (182). Tillis claims that most media figures are fantasy figures 
and, therefore, are not concerned with naturalistic images; in other words, they do 
not hold a mirror up to nature, which actors can do easily. In this way, he claimed 
that media figures are similar to puppets as they reflect the imagination of the 
puppet artist, presenting characters other than actual living beings. Reading into 
Kaplin’s article, Tillis finds a definition of puppetry that he describes as 
revolutionary: “if the signification of life can be created by people, then the site of 
that signification is to be considered a puppet” (185). This definition works to 
describe all non-human significations of life created by people in stage-works that 
interact with humans.  
In his research, Callesen describes the work Acting for Animators – A Complete Guide 
to Performance Animation, whose author, Ed Hooks, gives film animators insight into 
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applying acting techniques to animated characters. Hooks claims that method acting 
is more suited to performance animation than other acting techniques because it 
gives the actor motivation for her actions (“The Family Factory” 153). For Hooks, the 
primary distinction between film animators and actors trained in American-style 
‘method acting’ is that “actors actually, for real, do it when they are acting”, while 
“animators actually, for real, describe it when they are acting” (qtd. in “The Family 
Factory” 153). As Callesen points out, this difference between doing and describing 
goes back to the two elements of storytelling first noted in opposition to one another 
by Aristotle and further differentiated by Brecht: the dramatic and the epic. Callesen 
describes puppet theatre as epic, not dramatic, as it primarily uses images and 
objects as a means of expression to tell a story.  
In many ways, the concept of a ‘technological puppet’ describes much about how 
technology in theatre that appears to be autonomous is played out on stage. The 
notion of the puppet theatre is a useful theoretical point of departure to describe the 
different levels of representation between technology, live actors and both virtual 
and physical space, and the use of autonomous behaviour from a dramaturgical 
perspective. As puppetry is an old medium that has been performing with human 
bodies far longer than digital media, we can use its theorisation of the relationship 
between inanimate objects and human bodies to inform our understanding of the 
interactions between computer-based and human bodies.  
Key figures from the Prague Circle agreed that the puppet was a pure sign, free from 
the ‘real’ life constraints of the actor and able to directly convey the author’s 
thought. Many of the Prague School writings were influenced by Otaker Zich’s 
article, in which he laid out two different perceptions which puppet theatre asks of 
us. This can be used to understand any anthropomorphic technology on stage since:  
 
… the puppets may be perceived either as living people or as lifeless dolls. Since 
we can perceive them only one way at a time, we are faced with two possibilities: 
a) we perceive the puppets as dolls, that is, we stress their inanimate character. 
It is the material they are made of that strikes us as something that we are 
really perceiving. In that case however, we cannot take seriously their speech 
or their movements, in short, any manifestations of their life; hence we find 
them comical and grotesque … 
b) But there is another possibility, we may conceive of the puppets as if they 
were living beings by emphasizing their lifelike expressions, their movements 
and speech and taking them as real. Our awareness that the puppets are not 
alive recedes, and we get the feeling of something inexplicable, enigmatic, 
and astounding. In this case, the puppets seem to act mysteriously. (qtd in 
Jurkowski 90) 
Non-human technological actors similarly can be perceived in these two ways – 
either as lifeless technology or an audience can be led to endow them with life, 
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whether they are ‘live’ or not. When a puppet – or a technology – evokes actions, it 
can be seen as an autonomous agent, despite the definition used by AI researchers 
that the system must make decisions. The acting object is perceived as making 
decisions, so while it is not autonomous, it appears as such.  
 
Veltrusky differentiates between what an actor enacts and what a puppeteer does:  
 
The manipulation of puppets is a human action that, by its general nature, is 
not a form of acting properly … It does not by itself represent human or 
anthropomorphic beings and their actions and behaviour; it makes the 
puppets represent them. To some extent it is comparable to the painter’s or 
the sculptor’s action, which also makes the picture or statue represent 
something rather than representing it by itself. (“Theatre in the Corridor” 74)  
 
A technological actor, like the puppet, could be seen to be a metaphor, a tool for 
human expression, or it could be seen to only represent itself. An acting robot 
vacuum, for example – does it serve a metaphorical function, does it express its own 
materiality or can it in fact signify a character? Or does it do all three at different 
times? 
 
In his 1964 article “Man and Object in Theater”, Veltrusky develops an interesting 
argument about objects as agents, whereby he uses Mukarovsky’s definition of 
personification: “It is enough if things which in reality are passive objects of a 
process appear as active subjects, even though they retain their usual appearance” 
(qtd. in Veltrusky 84). While most objects gain their dramatic meaning through 
‘metonymy’ – their relationship to actors and action –  
 
…an object turns into a sign because of their combination with acting, their 
capacity to evoke such actions as part of their own respective meanings which 
tends to become their chief quality. This state of affairs is separated by only a 
very small step from the objects’ being perceived as agents. (“Puppet Theatre 
and Acting” 87)  
 
Examining the literature on puppetry and agency, it appears that puppetry has 
reconciled the question I posed earlier around the need for non-human actors to 
actually be live (as Saltz insists), or whether they can in fact just simulate liveness. 
Puppetry poses that a non-human actor can be perceived as either liveless or living, 
and it can be perceived as living based on the actors capacity to make the puppet 
represent and appear to have agency. It is the human actors capacity to ‘live 
through’ the lifeless object that allows this perception to occur. Translated to cyborg 
theatre then, the actors capacity to live through the technological actor is critical, not 
its ‘live’ quality.  
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Jennifer Parker-Starbuck notes that puppetry is a precursor to cyborg theatre, 
however she pays little attention to this form in her analysis. She defines puppets as 
‘abject technology’, an older form of multimedia theatre (of which she sees cyborg 
theatre as an aspect) (2003 4-5).  
 
… an abject body-abject technology meeting might be illustrated by a puppet 
on stage, both a forerunner and continuing colleague of the cyborg. This 
illustration of an abject-abject analysis within cyborg performance might 
focus on its non-human body that is yet materially resistant to its mediatized 
counterparts (Disney’s Pinocchio, for example); the analysis might return it to 
“poor theatre,” stripped of electronic or digital media. (Parker-Starbuck, 2011 
42) 
Rather than position puppetry on an historical timeline that leads from puppetry to 
subject technology, I propose that puppetry has the tools to make the non-human 
actor appear to have agency in such a way that a puppet can be subject in theatre. 
Puppetry has much to teach a theatre that incorporates human and technological 
actors, especially in defining strategies for a director to employ. I recognised this 
early on in my studies and employed the services of a puppeteer to assist in the 
practice component of this research, which was critical in being able to perform with 
a robot vacuum.   
 
Theological Theatre and Technological Bodies  
 
Historically puppetry has posed a threat to the living actor in theatre, in much the 
same way as technological actors have recently, which I will elaborate on in chapter 
two. It was the Prague School’s semiotic study of puppetry that illustrated its 
position to the metaphysics of presence and therefore a “theological mode of 
theatrical authorship” (Shershow 219). The contribution of the Prague School to 
theatre scholarship is their analysis of puppetry as something to study in its own 
right. They sought to examine puppetry’s perception by an audience, different from 
and in relation to live actors. While their conclusions may be ‘logo-centric’, their 
analysis is one to consider in terms of technological theatre with digital puppets and 
other artificial humans.  
 
Shershow describes the ‘theological theatre’ after Roland Barthes and Jacques 
Derrida: “a theatre in which player-puppets are seen to embody the sovereign 
intentions of an author-creator ” (9). Barthes refers to classical Western ideas of 
authorship as ‘theological’ in his celebrated 1968 essay “The Death of the Author”. 
Similarly, Jacques Derrida refers to the Western vision of theatrical representation as 
‘the theological theatre’ in his 1978 reading of Antonin Artaud, “The Theater of 
Cruelty and the Closure of Representation”. Shershow uses this phrase:  
 
to suggest the philosophical and cultural hierarchies that would later be 
imposed on the unruly conditions of actual dramatic performance, while also 
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conceding the profound ontological suspicion with which the theater has also 
been viewed both by Plato himself and in later Christian theology. (9)  
 
The argument that Shershow develops demonstrates that puppetry has historically 
been a threat to the theological theatre, which reifies human presence as standing in 
for an author’s text. The puppet has been a metaphor, refered to as an inanimate 
object, a material vessel for the master author. It has been something to fear in both 
an everyday context and on stage. This fear persists today as digital puppets, 
computer-based technologies and other multimedia enter stage to co-act with 
humans. What is challenged by the presence of non-humans in theatre is the human 
body, and for that reason scholarship around the relationship between technology 
and bodies has dominated this nascent field. Nadja Masura is one such scholar who 
employs the term ‘digital theatre’ broken down into four categories, to describe the 
body / technology relationship: 
  
1) Liveness or co-presence between performers and audience;  
2) Digitally enabled which is simply presence of digital media in the performance as 
an essential part of the artistic event; 
3) Limited interactivity between performers and audience;  
4) Spoken or language content which might constitute a narrative or story in order to 
differentiate it from dance, art or music (4-5).  
Masura looks back at the use or proposition of human and puppet interactions (via 
Gordon Craig, Oscar Schlemmer and other Bauhaus and Futurist artists) and makes 
a correlation between digital characters and puppets, stating that they perform 
similar functions. For Masura, both demonstrate their difference from the human 
flesh; therefore they emphasise our common humanity and enable us to “rediscover 
the body’s meaning as the commonality of human experience” (57).  
Another scholar writing in this area is Russell Fewster who describes four bodily 
presences to consider when balancing the live performer with live technologies: 
phenomenological (a biological body), gestic (body signifying, remediating the 
media), aesthetic (developed through training that demystifies notions of presence) 
and hyperbody (enacting media to undermine it) (Relationship 40).  
The phenomenological or felt body is the literally present body of the mortal human 
performer (Relationship 39-40). The signified body refers to the gestures or actions that 
a body performs, which signify “a particular social and political attitude” drawing 
on Brecht’s theory of gestus (Relationship 40). In relation to technology, the signified 
body replicates media on stage. The aesthetic body is the trained performer’s body; and 
lastly, the hyperbody is the technology itself and its virtual presence. 
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this includes images of the body that are replicated via the tools of 
mediatisation: television and the internet, in which we as viewers are 
implicated, and for which, as consumers and therefore as the locus of 
demand, ultimately share responsibility for. (Relationship 40) 
Fewster’s hyperbody acknowledges “the power of media to mass replicate digital 
images of the body that are able to multiply streamed into the performance space” 
(Relationship 42). The aesthetic body is about “demystifying the notion of stage 
presence” (Relationship 42) and recognises how the trained body of the actor works 
on an audience to create a certain kind of presence for them. 
 
Fewster provides a detailed analysis of commentators including Baudrillard, Phelan 
and Auslander, among others, who all agree a key aspect of stage presence is the 
“shared time/space mortality” of performer and audience (Relationship 41), and he 
describes this as the phenomenological body which emphasises the experience of 
theatre. 
Fewster’s signified body describes the actor that “emulates and mimics the physical 
actions of the actor captured on screen media thereby gesturing ironically towards 
those actions” (Relationship 49). Fewster offers the signified body as an historical 
dimension from which to read contemporary performance: 
This is a fundamental technique of mediatised theatre/performance. It draws 
on the application of Brecht's theory of gestus, but situates the performer’s 
gestures within a globalised field of mediatised signs. As such this technique 
takes on a post-Brechtian strategy, situating it within both intermedial and 
postdramatic approaches to dramaturgy. (Relationship 49) 
 
The signified body is one that emerged with “cinification of the stage” (Relationship 41) 
that includes an ‘epic’ style of acting, or demonstration rather than imitation. 
Fewster’s terms are useful to describe different versions of the body’s relationship to 
technology and I will return to these in my discussion of Cyborg No Exit in chapter 
four. However, it is Parker-Starbuck’s taxonomy that I find most useful and all 
encompassing as it uses the cyborg as a metaphoric structure created through 
intertwinement and negotiation between organic and inorganic materials. Parker-
Starbuck is clear that cyborg theatre is one mode of analysis for the integration of 
bodies and technology on stage “…taking a fragmented and hybridized ‘subject’ as a 
given, using it as a starting point to redress the ‘subject’ and reframe/claim bodies 
once thought of as abject/object/subject as cyborg-subject on stage” (2011 4).  
 
This formulation of cyborg theatre uses the term ‘cyborg’ differently from Dixon and 
Giannaci, who describe more literal mixings of technology and live performance. 
Parker-Starbuck sees the cyborg as a useful metaphoric concept to explore how non-
literal mergings can destabilise various binaries: body/technology, able/disabled, 
even human/non-human. It is this metaphoric capacity of Parker-Starbuck’s 
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taxonomy that I respond to and the manner in which her cyborg theatre provides a 
comprehensive language that can be employed to discuss bodies and technologies, 
human and non-human actors in theatre. Her concept of subject technology is most 
appealing to my explorations as a theatre director. Yet her analysis does not break 
subject technology down into further categories nor provide any strategies for 
practitioners to work with subject technology, which is where my study becomes 
relevant.    
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have explored when and how a technology can be considered an 
actor (subject technology) and through various discussions explored whether a 
technological actor needs to be literally subject or simply attain subject status. 
Throughout, I have described three different relationships of technology as actor, 
which could be defined as follows: 
1) Technological puppets, where the technology is operated by human agency;  
2) Technological performers, where the technology has autonomous agency but does 
not purport to signify anything other than itself; and  
3) Technological actors, where the technology is separate from human agency and 
makes autonomous choices.  
In the nascent phase of cyborg theatre – a theatre that incorporates technology as 
actor – it is useful for practitioners to understand the different methods of engaging 
technology as actor, and consider whether such technology performs autonomously, 
as a puppet, or as signifier of character. I have drawn on a number of fields such as 
animal training, computer science and puppetry to find a language that can be used 
in dramaturgical discussions of work that incorporates subject technology. In the 
following chapter, I will provide a more detailed investigation into the concept of 
theatrical presence in order to establish how cyborg theatre unsettles this 
fundamental concept, which has, in many ways, defined theatre as a distinctive art 
form. It is necessary to unpack this fundamental issue, in order to understand what a 
director is up against when creating cyborg theatre works. 
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CHAPTER TWO  
In this chapter, I will first establish the centrality of presence to the vast body of 
commentary on theatre. Then I will draw on Derrida’s analysis of the metaphysics of 
presence to unsettle dominant assumptions about the function of presence in theatre, 
arguing that such a privileging of presence demonises technology as a form of 
contamination, which impedes theatre’s ability to represent ‘truth’. I will go on to 
elaborate Cormac Power’s three modes of presence in order to position a discussion 
of my own work in subsequent chapters. I continue to use the term ‘cyborg theatre’ 
to discuss four examples of digital performance that have used technology to 
question and challenge our relationship to technology in the everyday. These works 
confront traditional notions of selfhood and force us to interrogate the borders 
between the live and the mediated, and provide the most important scholarly 
context for my creative work in the field of cyborg theatre. I have selected these 
works as key examples of how a director works with technology to augment human 
actors’ auratic presence or how they simulate human actors auratic presence in non-
human actors.  
Metaphysics of Presence 
 
As Giannachi, Kaye and Shanks point out in their introduction to Archeologies of 
Presence, “In performance theory and practice, presence is both fundamental and 
highly contested” (2). They go on to note “these discourses…have frequently hinged 
on the relationship between the live and mediated, on notions and effects of 
immediacy, authenticity and originality” (2).  
 
Derrida argues that the desire of numerous theatre practitioners to attain ‘pure 
presence’ – to eliminate all representation and reach a pure state – is not possible or 
desirable. Full presence is not possible because the meaning of a word or thing is 
differential and relational; nothing means anything in and of itself. No instant can 
exist outside of time, which is disappearing as it appears, just as meaning is never 
fully present; it never comes to rest. Meaning is always deferred along an endless 
chain of signification. There is nothing outside of difference because without 
difference there is no kind of being. Derrida demonstrates that every known thing is 
defined by what it is not rather than by any stable essence; therefore there is no such 
thing as a thing in itself. Derrida coins the term différance to convey the impossibility 
of full presence.  
Différance itself is indeterminable and therefore meaning arises from something that 
is not present. For example, Derrida argues in relation to language, “The difference 
which establishes phonemes and lets them be heard remains in and of itself 
inaudible” (“Différance” 19). Referring to this play of presence and absence as 
différance contains the dual meanings of its Latin root differer: 1) “’to defer’ (as for 
example when we say that the present is always a deferred present, that the wholly 
present present will always exist tomorrow)”; and 2) “not to be identical” 
(Descombes 145).  
The concept of différance is important here as it helps us to understand how what 
Derrida calls the “metaphysics of classical theatre” (“Différance” 19) have inhibited 
the use of digital technology in theatre. Artaud and Stanislavski, as well as others 
such as Meisner, Hagen and Barba, have a strong desire for various forms of 
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theatrical presence. These practitioners generally dismiss the use of technology in 
theatre because they imagine that technology contaminates the experience of full 
presence. Grotowski’s Poor Theatre is a perfect example of the metaphysics of 
presence being used to define what is essential about theatre. Grotowski believed he 
had discovered theatre’s essence by stripping it to the actor/spectator relationship:  
By gradually eliminating whatever proved superfluous, we found that theatre 
can exist without make-up, without autonomic costumes and scenography, 
without a separate performance area (stage), without lighting and sound 
effects, etc. It cannot exist without the actor-spectator relationship of 
perceptual, direct, “live” communion. (19)  
   
Fig. 2 Laboratory Theatre, “Akropolis.” Polish Cultural Institute New York. Web. 5 May 2015.  
Throughout his career, Grotowski continued to strip theatre to find its ‘centre’, as 
can been seen in his famous work Akropolis above (Figure 2). This constant 
deferment eventually left him with not much more than “an extended session of 
psychotherapy” (Innes 175). Grotowski defined Poor Theatre in direct opposition to 
other media. His emphasis on the literal actor-audience relationship reflects what 
Walter Benjamin described as aura, “its presence in time and space, its unique 
existence at the place where it happens to be” (3). Grotowski’s tendency was to see 
theatre “as a place whose purity – unsullied by the technologies of mass 
consumption and reproduction – is to be venerated” (Power 147). Grotowski defined 
theatre with reference to this concept of aura, which film apparently lacks.  
Antonin Artaud craved a theatre that was not of repetition: “…theater is the only 
place in the world where a gesture once made can never be made the same way 
twice”(qtd. in Derrida “Theater of Cruelty” 312). Theatre’s liveness, its presence, its 
non-repeatability, its ability to disappear as it appears, makes it seem very similar to 
‘the present’ – that thing that is gone before it has arrived. But Derrida demonstrates 
through an analysis of Artaud’s Theatre of Cruelty that a “representation that is not 
repetition”, a “re-presentation which is full presence”, a “present which does not 
repeat itself” is inaccessible. It is a “nonpresent” (“Theater of Cruelty” 313). 
Among performance theorists, Derrida’s analysis of phonocentrism has been the 
area most discussed. Here, Derrida unsettles the assumption that language is a 
stable structure capable of full presence. He describes a privileging of ‘speech’ over 
‘writing’ that assumes speech is a direct articulation of thought while writing 
misrepresents the ‘truth’ of speech. It was an assumption of traditional theatre that 
went unquestioned, according to Elinor Fuchs, until Derrida overturned it by 
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pointing out that speech is made up of signs (writing) that make difficult the 
presence of the spoken instant, as the listener does not in fact hear the speaker’s 
thoughts but the citation of writing (“Presence and the Revenge of Writing” 165-
166). 
Modes of Presence 
Cormac Power’s Presence in Play provides a comprehensive analysis of theatrical 
presence, critiquing both traditional notions and deconstructionist perspectives of 
presence. Power points out that since Derrida, some poststructuralist theatre 
theorists “have tended to look at (P)resence as a singular, monolithic entity. In doing 
so, much is missed in terms of how theatre, made of competing modes of presence 
(“presence” rather than Presence) has the capacity to explore and “play” with 
notions of presence” (118). Furthermore, Power defines theatrical presence in three 
distinct modes: the ‘fictional mode’ of ‘making present’ the fictional world of the 
play; the ‘auratic mode’ of ‘having presence’ as charisma of the actor; and the ‘literal 
mode’ of actor ‘being-present’ literally with an audience (co-presence).  
Power describes presence essentially as: 
the foundation of the actor’s performance, and that an essential part of what 
the performer does in training and preparation for performance is to develop 
her capacity to exhibit this quality of presence. It is not so much a case of the 
actor having or not having presence, but of the extent to which the actor 
succeeds in working against factors which undermine presence. (7)  
Power describes the fictional mode of presence as “ideas which explore theatre’s 
capacity for making fictional propositions present” (15). It is within the fictional 
mode that theatre proposes to fulfill its potential to make present the fictional (15). 
The fictional mode is about the ‘drama’ being made present. The fictional mode 
requires a separation from the actual world of the stage: 
We are never fooled into thinking that the chairs and tables on stage are 
actually those in a fiction, but we agree to pretend that they are by mentally 
marking those objects “with a minus sign” – their reality has been subtracted. 
(Power 18)  
In theatre, in order to “make-present” a fictional world, real objects and people 
pretend they are something other than themselves: “Theatre is a form of 
representation that works by infusing a present context (a stage, or actor-audience 
relationship) with pretence” (Power 45).  
Power’s notion of ‘having-presence’ – auratic presence – is “perhaps most difficult to 
define, within which an audience member may easily recognise and experience” 
(47). Auratic presence is aligned with charisma, a “sense of prestige and authority” 
(Power 47). It is the fact that this type of presence is intangible and doesn’t refer to 
anything specific that makes it difficult to determine.  
Aura is a term with mysterious connotations, referring to a presence which is 
above the ordinary, an abstract quality that can be attached to people, names, 
objects or places which have more significance than appearance might 
suggest. (Power 47)  
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The definition of auratic presence that Power explores and settles on is relevant to 
this study. He describes the Wooster Group’s performance of a video recording of 
Grotowski’s Akropolis as revealing virtuosity of the Wooster Group actors, which 
then manifests a new auratic presence (73).  
Poor Theatre, A series of Simulacra does not demonstrate that aura in theatre is 
contrived or necessarily underpinned by ideas of the actor’s self-revelation; if 
anything, this performance serves to highlight that it is the actors’ training, 
preparation and commitment which underpins the impact of the performers 
on the stage. (Power 73)  
Power settles on the notion, within which Joseph Chaikin from the Open Theatre 
worked, “that actor presence is a negotiation between the actor and the text or score 
and the audience” (78). The understanding of presence demonstrated by the Open 
Theatre, and referred to by Power, is one in which the actor is aware of the entire 
play and the audience-actor relationship. The actual time, place and actors must be  
Of his three modes, Power’s “literal presence” is the most factual, as it takes into 
account the presence of the spectators. He describes this mode as one that has sought 
to demystify the modernist conceit of aura, shifting debates of presence to a 
postmodern concern around the “spectator’s experience of reading the event” (87). 
Power argues that “being-present” is not entirely separate from “making-present” or 
“having-presence” (89). As the artwork exists for an audience, it is not “valued on its 
own terms, but in terms of the viewer’s (physical) relationship to it” (Power 98). The 
move away from ‘theatre’, and subsequently the ‘turn to performance’ described 
previously, is an emphasis on the co-presence of spectator with performer (Power 
103).  
Whereas performance was seen as a site of energy flows wherein performers 
and audience could share in the immediacy of art making, theatre was seen 
(recalling Artaud) as an institutionalised art form with a pretended rather 
than “actual” immediacy – or presence. (Power 104) 
The characteristics of traditional theatre – the memorising and delivery of text 
written by an author as a complete closed fictional world – provide the site where 
the ‘metaphysics of presence’ operates most obviously. Speech is a servile sign of the 
written word, wherein the audience knows but agrees to pretend that the speech 
they hear is not written elsewhere. While speech in theatre has been privileged, it is 
the site where speech in the shadow of writing is most obvious. Here we see 
Derrida’s notion of the privileging of presence played out. Power suggests, though, 
that when theatre highlights “its existence as part of a mediatic system rather than as 
a privileged bearer of unmediated ‘nowness’, it is more likely to realise its potential 
to show how the ‘(im)mediate’ is itself ‘mediated’” (156). 
 
When looking at theatre in terms of presence, the point is not so much 
whether a performance is “live” and whether it demonstrates a sense of 
unproblematic “immediacy” but with how the interrelation between action 
and representation reveal the ambiguity of presence when placed under 
theatrical manipulation. (Power 165) 
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Power argues that Derrida does not place a negative value on presence, but rather 
unsettles long held assumptions about the concept, such as those demonstrated by 
Grotowski and Stanislavski.  
 
…Derrida, far from being “against” presence, is concerned instead to draw 
out its complexities and instabilities, and theatre is a medium through which 
“the transformational possibilities of thinking presence”… can be most deeply 
explored. (137) 
 
The literal mode of presence is that which is most common to theatrical discourse, 
often taken as a fundamental given – the co-presence of audience and performer. 
The literal mode has been emphasised in postmodern and postdramatic works, in 
which the literal presence of audience becomes the focus or is consciously 
prioritised, as a move away from the auratic presence of the actor. However the 
literal presence of audience with spectator has also been challenged by the 
emergence of ‘digital liveness’.  
 
Digital Liveness 
 
The binary opposition of ‘live’ and ‘mediatised’ put forward by Auslander to some 
extent perpetuates the myth of presence, as it constitutes theatre within the site of 
presence. The notion of ‘live’ corresponds to Derrida’s notion of speech, where we 
see ourselves as being literally present with the actors, and the notion of ‘recorded’ 
corresponds to Derrida’s conception of writing, where the recorded is derived from 
the live and is therefore inferior (Différance 148). With the emergence of ‘digital 
liveness’, Auslander redefined his notion of the live. Speaking at the Transmediale 
11 conference in Berlin, Auslander describes his new definition:  
 
Liveness is no longer defined as presence of physical persons in front of each 
other or physical and temporal relationships. The audience’s experience is 
now the locus of liveness. Some technological object makes a claim on us to 
consider it as live. In order for liveness to occur we must accept the claim as 
binding upon us, take it seriously and hold on to the object in our 
consciousness of it in such a way that it becomes live for us. This is not a 
characteristic of the object nor an effect caused by some characteristic of the 
object but liveness is produced through our engagement with the object and 
our willingness to accept its claim. Digital liveness emerges as a specific 
relation between self and other. Our conscious act at grasping virtual acts as 
live in response to the claims they make on us. (“Realtime”) 
 
Here Auslander redefines liveness as the audience’s experience: the ‘performance’ 
could be any technological object that claims to be considered live, and liveness 
occurs when we accept this claim (“Realtime”).  In 2002, Auslander published a 
provocative paper in Performing Arts Journal entitled “Live from Cyberspace, Or, I 
Was Sitting at My Computer This Guy Appeared He Thought I Was a Bot”. The crux 
of Auslander’s argument was that: “The chatterbot forces the discussion of liveness 
to be reframed as a discussion of the ontology of the performer rather than of the 
performance” (“Live from Cyberspace” 20). He makes this claim because the internet 
chatterbot performs live according to one of the Oxford English Dictionary’s 
definitions of live: “Of a performance, heard or watched at the time of its occurrence, 
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as distinguished from one recorded on film, tape, etc” (“Live from Cyberspace” 20). 
Internet chatterbots are “themselves performing entities that construct their 
performances at the same time as we witness them” (“Live from Cyberspace” 20).  
 
The contention arises because Auslander’s proposition suggests that the performer 
as a live person no longer determines a live performance. Therefore, “it subverts the 
centrality of the live, organic presence of human beings to the experience of live 
performance; and it casts into doubt the existential significance attributed to live 
performance” (21). Auslander has come up with his new definition of liveness 
because digital technologies have destabilised our notions of the live, which were 
constructed around analogue technologies.  
 
Auslander’s notion that liveness is not dependent on the performer but rather on the 
spectator is important when we investigate further the relationship between digital 
technologies and their use in theatre. I will now turn to an analysis of four landmark 
productions, and argue that their use of technology in theatre has grappled with an 
understanding of theatrical presence. 
Supervision 
 
Fig. 3 The Builders Association’s “Supervision.” The Builders Association website. Web. 5 May 2015.  
Since 1994, Marianne Weems’ company The Builders Association has been exploring 
“the interface between media and live performance in a culture which is irrevocably 
mediatised, not a culture that still privileges ‘liveness’” (Weems and Svich 51). This 
particular brand of theatre immerses actors’ bodies within a dominant screen stage, 
making visible the operators of the media; Weems often films and projects actors 
‘live’ while on stage. People ask her why she does not make film, and Weems’ 
answer is that she takes pleasure in discovering “what is happening to these very 
strong performers in a very strong media environment and how their presence is 
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either extended in some ways and amplified or compromised or endangered” (qtd. 
in Kaye 576).  
This exploration of the impact of technology on presence is not the only feature of 
the company’s work. Often the characters evolve within a technological world, 
existing in “virtual and screen based environments which multiply perspectives on 
the characters and the narrative events” (Kilch and Scheer 52). In an article about the 
company’s 2005 show Supervision, Nick Kaye interviewed a number of participants 
in the production. Weems explained that she had worked with actors who say, 
“nobody is going to be looking at me, they are just going to be looking at the screen” 
(qtd. in Kaye 576), to which Kaye commented that after seeing the production three 
times, he found the actors’ live presence to be amplified by the screens’ presence, 
“even when the actor has her back to the audience”(576). He explained: “It is in 
dialogue with the whole machine that surrounds them – their presence does become 
more articulated and magnified” (576).  
What Kaye is describing here is an enhancement of the auratic presence of the 
performer as a result of the performers’ immersion within subject and object 
technologies. Auratic presence can manifest either as reputation based on 
expectations, or as a construction in performance, “The actor’s (auratic) presence can 
be constructed through his manipulation of space and materials, including his own 
body and posture…” (49). The Builders Association’s work consciously aims to 
demonstrate the complexity of human presence. Amplification of the performers 
when juxtaposed with ‘subject technology’ is not an erasure of presence from the 
stage. Rather, it is an integrated use of media within which live performers make 
more visible the audience’s process of constructing presence in its fictional mode: it 
highlights the way in which we receive the auratic presence of the live performers 
and our literal presence with them in a room.  
Supervision’s narrative is primarily about selfhood, and the production explores the 
concept of data bodies – “versions of ourselves that exist in data space as the 
collation of all data files collected about us” (Kilch & Scheer 55). Through three 
interconnected stories of human-computer relations, the technology oscillates 
between merging with, interfering with, dominating and displacing the human 
actor/characters. Like many of the Builders Association productions, the set is an 
integration of technology and the live so that at times the border between the two 
becomes invisible.  
In a 2005 e-interview with Performance Paradigm, Auslander stated that live bodies 
and projections on the same stage always privilege the projections, reiterating a 
commonly held belief:  
This is partly a perceptual matter: the projected images are usually larger and 
brighter and therefore attract more attention. But it also has to do with the 
cultural dominance of the screened image at this historical moment. (1) 
While this view could be true in specific performances, it is not a given that 
projections overwhelm live bodies. Given this perspective, it is interesting to explore 
the performers’ own experience of working with these technologies.  
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For a stage actor, interacting with projected media is obviously a different 
experience to interacting with other live people. The actors’ capacity to ‘make 
present’ and ‘be present’ is challenged, but this performance dilemma is not a new 
one. When cinema first emerged and theatre actors found themselves performing in 
front of a camera, the experience was one of estrangement. Walter Benjamin refers to 
Pirandello’s novel Si Gira, in which Pirandello states:  
The film actor…feels as if in exile – exiled not only from the stage but also 
from himself. With a vague sense of discomfort he feels inexplicable 
emptiness: his body loses its corporeality, it evaporates, it is deprived of 
reality, life, voice, and the noises caused by his moving about, in order to be 
changed into a mute image, flickering an instant on the screen, then vanishing 
into silence…(qtd. by Benjamin 10) 
Benjamin goes on to say that “for the first time … man has to operate with his whole 
living person, yet forgoing its aura” (10). As actors have learnt to work with the 
various mediating elements of theatre – set, costume, mask, lights – actors in cyborg 
works such as Supervision learn to alter their performance.  
One of the actors, Rizwan Mirza, was asked if his process of developing his character 
had been contained within the technology, or separately. He replied that performing 
in Supervision was like being in a theatre piece and a film at the same time. It is 
necessary to “rein in” the “whole idea of theatre voice and theatre presence” – that 
is, the auratic mode – even when “playing in front of a house of a thousand, because 
you are on camera a lot of the time” (Mirza qtd. in Kaye 570). 
The wonderful thing for me as an actor, and the thing that is very fulfilling, is 
that the slightest nuance of an eye movement or facial twitch reads in the 
theatre. That is an incredible feeling. (Mirza qtd. in Kaye 570) 
This performer is describing his experience of being both literally present and 
literally not present at the same time in front of an audience, reining in his ‘aura’ 
(auratic presence) to be able to exist in both planes. In ‘present time’ he must ‘make 
present’ the projected, mediatised version of himself, giving it ‘life’ as a puppeteer 
must do with a puppet. Mirza explained that he was never looking at his fellow 
actor Joe Silovsky; however he did use this disconnect to build his character. 
Silovsky’s character was confronting someone that he could not see for whom he 
was. The physical parameters that the technology imposed on the actors contributed 
to their work of ‘making present’ a fictional world. In this way the disconnect from 
his fellow actor helped Mirza.  
Another actor, Moe Angelos, was looking at a monitor for almost the entire show, 
making hers literally a ‘webcam performance’. She explains that for her this was 
‘real’. This is another example of the way technology contributes to actors’ work of 
making present a fiction:  
… because that is what you do when you are chatting to someone on a 
webcam. You are sitting at a computer, looking at this little eye that is the 
camera, and you are watching them and they are watching you … I use it to 
frame myself. It is strangely voyeuristic, or narcissistic, in a certain way, 
because I am just looking at myself in the same way as when we walk past a 
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mirror … I am sitting there and I catch myself looking at myself – watching to 
see where I am: am I framed properly?. (Angelos, qtd. in Kaye 572) 
One of the key distinctions between the live and the mediatised occurs because 
digital projections are two-dimensional and live bodies are three-dimensional. I will 
now examine two works that have made their projections appear to be three-
dimensional in an effort to combine the worlds of the live and the mediatised. Rather 
than technology dominating the human performer, it could be argued that these 
works seamlessly integrate the two- and three-dimensional planes. George Coates 
did this, perhaps for the first time, with stereographic animation that made it appear 
as if three-dimensional humans were inside a three-dimensional animated world. 
And Blast Theory made a virtual person become three-dimensional by merging it 
with a live person at a critical moment of revelation.  
Desert Rain 
 
Fig. 4 Blast Theory’s “Desert Rain.” Blast Theory website. Web. 5 May 2015.  
Blast Theory’s 1999 work Desert Rain was inspired by the first Gulf War, and was 
one of the first games-based works by that company. Like Supervision, the 
technology is vital to the narrative as it “explores the implications of society’s 
reliance on the technologies of representation to access the real” (Kilch and Scheer 
147). Using media and technology in theatre has always made sense to Blast Theory, 
within the subject that the company has consistently explored – society in a 
mediatised world.  
The technology in Desert Rain (Figure 4 above) is used to offer a critique of modern 
warfare, inspired by Jean Baudrillard’s declaration that the Gulf War did not take 
place but that it was a virtual event, in his book the gulf war did not take place. The 
virtual reality technology used in Desert Rain was provided by a university media 
lab in what became a long-term collaborative relationship with the company. Unlike 
Supervision, Desert Rain immerses the audience in the work itself, enabling them to 
interact with its physical and technological dimensions. Interactivity has always 
been a key feature of Blast Theory’s work as the company sees this as integral to 
collaboratively making sense of collective lives (Adams, Farr andTandavanitj).  
Desert Rain begins when a performer gives six spectators each a card with a picture 
of their target, and leads them into a chamber divided into six cubicles, one for each 
 48
viewer. The spectator stands on a platform and faces a fine water spray screen upon 
which a virtual world is projected. They travel through the virtual environment by 
moving their weight on footpads that act as large joysticks. As an avatar, the 
spectator searches the virtual desert for their target. In the virtual environment, there 
are three buildings, the third of which contains the target. Once the spectator reaches 
the building, a real performer slowly emerges through the rain-screen to hand the 
spectator another card.  
In Desert Rain literal presence of the human body was amplified when the real 
‘target’ emerged seemingly from within the digital projection. The actor’s literal 
presence made present the fictional world in a very visceral way. The viewer was 
brought back from the virtual – and fictional – to the literal, “creating a kind of 
media vortex in which the various worlds explored by the piece suddenly 
manifested themselves to the viewer in rapid succession” (Giannachi 118). The 
boundaries between the mediated image and the physical person were blurred in 
Desert Rain just as the first Gulf War was brought to many of us through mass 
media, blurring our relationship to the physical people it effected.5  
Here the participant-spectators’ own liveness within the work further complicated 
the experience of mediation and the ‘nowness’ of theatre. Their presence directly 
impacted upon the concepts being explored in the work. They had the capacity, 
through headphones, to communicate with one another, so that their own presence 
was also seamlessly integrated within the technological world. Their presence 
became virtual as their literal presence merged with the fictional presence of the 
world.  
In Desert Rain, by creating the world of illusion out of both real and virtual 
elements, the participant’s experience of the world is grounded in real-time, 
intrinsically focused on the absorption of the now. (Kilch and Scheer 188) 
Desert Rain is a perfect example of cyborg theatre, where the live performers as well 
as the physical set elements are not privileged over the technology but integrated in 
such a way that the presence of both is often indeterminable. Key company member 
Ju Row Farr described Blast Theory’s early works as collage-like in structure, with 
lots of thoughts and processes (Adams, Farr and Tandavanitj). Desert Rain was the 
company’s first games-based work, and Matt Adams claimed that its strength is the 
powerful relationships this kind of work creates between audient/player and the 
game characters/identities: “This technologically mediated relationship where you 
are both chasing each other and playing with each other and chatting with each 
other – games are great at creating relationships and meaning out of those 
relationships” (Adams, Farr and Tandavanitj).  
The open invitation to participate creates a situation where audience/players’ literal 
presence is incorporated into the fictional world. The company explained to me that 
in order to make performance endure in an age of mass media, they wanted to make 
sure it focused on being ‘right here, right now’ and that the possibilities were open. 
They wanted to create work that extended live properties so they made it interactive, 

5 The Persian Gulf War was an international conflict that took place between 1990-1991, when Iraq invaded and 
occupied Kuwait, to take control of their large oil reserves.  
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fluid, malleable and responsive. As a third company member, Nick Tandavanitj, put 
it in my interview with him: 
You are invited to be in a relationship with the character – a confidant, as 
opposed to a purely empathic relationship – much more actively addressing 
you and your intelligence as a person, being more directed on your emotional 
engagement as a participant yourself. (Adams, Farr and Tandavanitj)  
In Desert Rain, the virtual technological performer became a three-dimensional 
technological actor seamlessly integrating the two and three-dimensional planes. 
The participants’ integration into the cyborg theatre work assisted in making present 
the fictional world of the play. The next work I will examine is an example of an 
effective counter to Auslander’s claims that technology overwhelms live performers 
by immersing the human body within a three-dimensional projection.  
Invisible Site 
 
Fig. 5 George Coates’ “Invisible Sites.” Transmit Media. Web. 5 May 2015.  
Performed in 1991, a very early exploration of integrating live performers with 
digital technologies was George Coates Performance Work’s Invisible Site: A Virtual 
Sho. This production employed a technique to produce an illusion that live 
performers were fully integrated in a rapidly moving 3D virtual environment. The 
spectators wore polarised glasses to view stereographic projections of digital 
animations. The projections were viewed on a transparent black scrim that sat 
between the performers and the spectators. Behind the scrim, three mechanised 
ramps lifted actors up and down to connect with projected imagery.  
In Invisible Site the actors’ liveness was the foundation upon which the entire look 
was built (Parker-Starbuck, 2003 152). It was a fusion of theatre and cinema. For 
example, a small child actor appeared to float up as a three-dimensional film 
projection as projections of white balloons rose at the same time, giving the 
appearance that balloons were lifting her through the sky. If this were entirely a film 
image it would have had a very different impact on the audience. While the white 
balloons were not present we know that the child was, and this dissolved the 
mediated reality of the balloons, making them appear to be actual, literal or ‘real’.  
This example demonstrates the capacity that a merging of live and technological 
actors has to explore and play with modes of presence and make present the virtual. 
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The literal difference between the live body and the digital balloon is momentarily 
suspended, therefore foregrounding the line between presence and non-presence 
that theatre treads. Three-dimensional projections provide a new kind of presence 
that competes with the literal and auratic modes of presence with which theatre 
traditionally provides us. In three-dimensional projection, the technology has 
entered the human domain yet it is still not tangible. It becomes present to us as a 
boundary-blurring entity.  
The three works examined so far use digital technologies to make evident the actors 
presence. These practitioners are not concerned with an essential notion of theatre – 
to ‘make present’ the present, to reach ‘true existence’ through the theatrical form. 
Their use of technology emphasises theatre’s claims to ‘liveness’ by juxtaposing the 
‘live’ with the ‘mediated image’. The productions also question our relationship to 
technology in everyday life. This juxtaposition questions acceptance of the live as 
unmediated, and begs consideration of how the fictional is made present. Digital 
technologies’ provides a place for the experience of presence to be visible – 
extended, amplified, compromised or endangered.   
In order to understand this further, I will now examine a work that seeks to trick the 
audience’s experience of presence by placing a human-like android in the role of 
lead actor with human actors.  
Sayonara 
 
Fig. 6 Sayonara by Seinenden Theatre Company. “Sayonara.” Japan Society. Web. 5 May 2015.  
Sayonara has been described by its director, Oriza Hirata, as the first theatre 
production to incorporate a humanoid-android as a character. Glenn D’Cruz 
observes that despite its faults the work presents its audience with “a compelling set 
of questions about the relationship between art, technology and humanity, with 
specific reference to questions of audience empathy, presence and representation” 
(274). He goes on to note that the star of the show, the android Geminoid F, is a 
prophetic figure: 
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I suspect that she might herald the start of a techno-logical revolution that 
will give us cause to reconsider the nature of human being itself, especially as 
we move towards technological singularity – that point, perhaps in the not-
too-distant future, when the capabilities of artificial intelligence exceed those 
of human beings. Sayonara is not a great play, but I don’t think that its 
importance should be measured in ordinary aesthetic or dramaturgical terms. 
(286) 
The android in this work visually resembles a human in so many ways that it is 
almost outside the description of Cyborg Theatre. The technology in this case strives 
to become human, which has implications on the humans who perform with it.  
Sayonara is a short play, 30 minutes long, performed by two actors with Geminoid F, 
a humanoid robot developed by Professor Hiroshi Ishiguro at Ishiguro Studios at the 
University of Osaka. It was originally performed as a fifteen-minute piece in English 
with Canadian actress Bryerly Long, and since its Australian Premiere at the Arts 
Centre Melbourne in August 2012, a second part was added with actor Tadashi 
Kaizu.  
The first part of the play is a dialogue between a dying girl (Long) and her 
companion Geminoid F. The android’s main function is to recite poetry, while she is 
also capable of conversing on many subjects, such as the reason the girl’s father 
purchased her. In the second section – which we understand takes place sometime 
later – the robot has malfunctioned and is being checked by a technician, who 
determines that she will be capable of reciting prayers for the dead at the site of a 
nuclear disaster, where humans are unable to enter.  
During its August 2012 season at Arts Centre Melbourne, Sayonara was presented for 
three performances with its entirely new second act performed in Japanese with 
English subtitles, while its original first act was performed in English. With 
agreement from the company, I sat in on their technical and dress rehearsals, 
watched two of the public performances and the subsequent question and answer 
sessions with roboticist Ishiguro and director Oriza Hirata. I also conducted 20-
minute interviews with actors Bryerly Long and Tadashi Kaizu, with Hirata and 
Ishiguro, as well as with the technical operator of the robot (all of which I 
subsequently published in Australasian Drama Studies).  
When I interviewed Hirata, the first thing he explained to me was that he found 
Ishiguro’s approach to robotics interesting because he is not trying to create an exact 
human replica, but to find what it is about us that makes us human, so that he can 
create robots that are convincingly human. Essentially Ishiguro is trying to 
understand how his machines can perform human presence. Ishiguro explained this 
to me as the search for human-like behaviour. He coined the term ‘Gemanoid’ to 
describe an android copy of a particular individual, after geminus, Latin for twin. He 
uses these humanlike robots to test his hypothesis, as well as seeking to understand 
“what the Japanese call sonzaikan – the feeling of being in the presence of a human 
being. Where does the sense of humanness come from? And can you convey those 
qualities with a robot?” (qtd. in Guizzo).  
In his program note, one of the actors, Tadashi Kaizu, noted that, “watching the 
android theatre as an audience member, the android showed me what it means to be 
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human. Working with her as an actor, she showed me what it means to be an actor” 
(Sayonara Program). Following Ishiguro’s logic that the android makes us aware of 
what we consider to be a human because that is the criterion on which we are 
judging the android, then the android-actor helps an actor know what it means to be 
an actor: doing what she cannot achieve. One can use the android’s limits to 
recognise one’s own capabilities as a human or an actor; however these limits can 
also become irritating when what one sees is a human, while what one gets is a tape 
recorder.  
The android’s resemblance to a human, through micro-movement and recognisable 
facial structure, plays a big part in our capacity to empathise with her. However, 
scientists have conducted significant research into the use of anthropomorphism to 
facilitate human-to-robot interaction, questioning whether this is the best design to 
enable humans to accept robots. There has been recognition among roboticists that 
conventional anthropomorphic design of robots has not been so successful because 
recognition technologies are limited, and so anthropomorphic interfaces generate 
false expectations of human-like responses and behaviours that lead to 
disappointment and confusion in users (Schneiderman et al. 484).  
When I interviewed the two actors, Bryerly Long and Tadashi Kaizu, they both 
described how the interaction of a human and an android on stage emphasised 
humanity (Long; Kaizu). Bryerly said she felt the android gave one the opportunity 
to think about what an actor is and how actors create emotion, possibly because the 
android also creates emotion – in the audience, in the actor herself, or perhaps both. 
While the android malfunctions in the second act, which makes her appear 
vulnerable and humanises her, she does not perform emotion as such. Bryerly’s 
comments suggest that if we are moved as an audience by an android, then this 
makes us consider what an actor must do in order to move us and create a 
convincing emotion. Specific gestures and minute facial expressions assisted in our 
capacity to empathise with the android, as we would with another human. Blinking 
of the eyes and micro-movements of the head gave her very human characteristics 
and again assisted in our ability to empathise. Emotive actuations, gaze cues and 
trust development were all incorporated into the android’s design. However, the 
actress who created the voice and movement of the robot was the one who conveyed 
or expressed the emotion. The android, therefore, is simply a recording of the 
actress’s emotional expression of the scene. Bryerly explained that as a performer 
sitting opposite the android on stage, it was her ‘feeling an emotion’ that provided 
an opportunity for the audience to empathise with the robot (Long).  
Human-like features can assist us to empathise with an inanimate object, especially 
when one considers what first engages a newborn baby – large eyes and the face. If 
an inanimate object has a semblance of these features, it is easier for us to perceive it 
as having human-like qualities that enable empathy. While numerous factors were 
considered in the design of the Sayonara android, the more human her face, the more 
we expected human responses from her. The android in Sayonara resembled a 
human so closely that she ‘simplified’ the human actor, who modified her behaviour 
to match the less sophisticated entity. The android asks us to read her as human, on 
the same plane as the human.  
In my interview with Ishiguro, he described theatre of the future as utilising more 
and more androids. “With or without humans?” I asked, to which he replied that 
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either possibility could eventuate (Ishiguro). Could we really watch a play 
performed solely by androids? What would we be watching? What would happen to 
our desire to watch ourselves if we were watching androids, presumably playing 
humans? Would it be similar to watching a film but embodied on stage in which all 
the characters were recordings? 
The technologies Ishiguro is developing are carer androids that help people who are 
isolated and alone. Sherry Turkle’s Alone Together provides a brilliant analysis of 
robots that substitute for human company as caregivers in everyday settings. She 
puts the success of these “emotion robots” down to the intimacy we desire, without 
the burden of friendship (1). “As sociable robots propose themselves as substitutes 
for people, new networked devices offer us machine-mediated relationships with 
each other, another kind of substitution“ (Turkle 3). A person under care develops a 
dependency on the carer – they trust that the carer will look after their welfare. It is 
in Ishiguro’s interest to create androids that are accepted as humans and are 
humane.  
What does this turn to robotic companionship mean for theatre? Is that where 
Ishiguro’s robots will end up – on stage, providing us our cathartic dose of theatre? 
While we may believe that an android carer feels for us (as Turkle demonstrates in 
numerous examples), it is absurd to imagine a theatre full of androids that care what 
we think as an audience.6 When we go to see a theatre show, we assume that the 
actors care what we think and feel – otherwise they would not perform to an 
audience. They want us to care about what they are doing, about their function in 
the fictional world of the play, their literal presence and appearance, or their aura 
generally. As an audience we could not suspend our disbelief that an android cares 
about what we think of their performance, unless perhaps the show was about just 
that.  
Ishiguro’s robots are being developed to serve a real-life function. Or are they? The 
fictional role that Hirata has given his android character is as a reciter of poetry for 
the dying and a prayer-sayer for the dead. Reciting poetry is a very emotive act. By 
enabling the android a nurturing, ‘humane’ role in his fiction, Hirata has given the 
android a semblance of empathy as a character that has or at least simulates 
emotion. Within this play, is the android a conduit for human expression – a puppet 
– or is it simply a machine – an actor-machine or a poetry-reciting machine?  
In many ways Geminoid F is not a subject technology at all. As D’Cruz points out, 
within Parker-Starbuck’s taxonomy she is an “object body” (285).  
… the body onto which ideas have been inscribed and transposed. These are 
often the feminized or racialised ‘other,’ as seen in the historical examples of 
the female automata, or they could be Foucault’s disciplined bodies; the object 
body is objectified, a tabula rasa (original emphasis) for the meaning inscribed 
upon it. (Parker-Starbuck, 2011 45) 

6 For example, Turkle describes a robot seal called PARO, which is used therapeutically to reduce stress and 
improve social relationships; AIBO, a robot dog that provide care for the elderly and an owl like toy called a 
Furby that reqires children to feed and care for it.   
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Conclusion 
The skeptical position on the use of technology in theatre, I contend, limits our 
capacity to utilise technological tools to ‘make present’ alternative subjectivities. 
Digital technologies integrated with live performers in narrative theatre can make 
sense of our place in the world, while questioning, challenging and displacing our 
traditional notions of selfhood. Theatre as a laboratory for witnessing the notion of 
presence at play can both expand and complicate our understanding of presence. In 
this chapter, I have examined how theatre has historically defined itself in terms of 
presence. I unpacked the notions of liveness and presence to further understand the 
apparent difference between theatre and other mediums. I used four examples of 
digital performance to argue that notions of ‘presence’ can be made evident through 
the use of technology while also contributing to unpacking the ambiguity of 
presence. Now through the examination of two of my own works and then my 
examination performance, I will look at strategies to employ that emphasis presence 
of both technological and human actors, when making cyborg theatre works.   
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
In the previous chapter I looked at various accounts of dramatic theatre as a unique 
site of literal co-presence. I drew on Derrida’s analysis of the metaphysics of 
presence to establish the centrality of presence in a significant amount of 
commentary on theatre, arguing that such a privileging of presence demonises 
technology as a form of contamination that impedes dramatic theatre’s ability to 
represent ‘truth’. While much has been theorised about presence in theatre, my 
position is that of a practitioner grappling with the problems that a privileging of 
presence brings to my work. In this chapter, I will describe and analyse how this 
encounter with theories of presence plays out as a practitioner in two specific 
examples of my creative work, which leads to the subsequent chapter outlining my 
practice work Cyborg No Exit.  
 
Methodologically, my research is primarily conducted by means of performance— in 
other words, it adopts the lens of practice-led research. That is, it proceeds from 
Susan Melrose’s observation that knowledge produced by practitioners is as valid as 
knowledge produced by what she calls ‘expert spectators’ (essentially scholars and 
critics without a professional creative practice). Put differently, in the words of 
Carole Gray: 
By practice-led I mean firstly research which is initiated in practice, where 
questions, problems, challenges are identified and formed by the needs of 
practice and practitioners; and secondly, that the research strategy is carried 
out through practice, using predominantly methodologies and specific 
methods familiar to us as practitioners. (3)   
This project, then, is concerned with producing new information about cyborg 
theatre through the practitioner’s lens. In summary, it draws on three key sources of 
knowledge: 
1) my self-reflexive experience as a theatre director engaged in working with human 
and technological actors, documented through journals; 
2) interviews with key practitioners involved in the field of cyborg performance 
practice; 
3) my critical reading of the scholarly literature on the various relationships between 
live performance and technology with a focus on the work of Starbuck-Parker and 
Power. 
Formal research methods that also include contextual and case study reviews, 
practical experiments and ethnographic observations. This subjective and 
phenomenological form of artistic research assumes that knowledge is developed 
through action and reflection. My own experiences and reactions have been the 
starting point for this situated enquiry. My studio practice that developed the two 
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case studies to be elaborated on in this chapter, were recorded through personal 
journal and video and photographic documentation. In the case of the Mixed Reality 
Performance Lab, an independent evaluator was engaged to evaluate the process. 
The audience was surveyed and the evaluators’ report as well as the audience 
surveys were data that informed my practice work Cyborg No Exit. This form of 
artistic enquiry is situated within a state of heightened reflexivity and unknowing, 
characteristic of much practice and practice-led research. Collaboration with other 
artists, including their perspectives through interviews, was critical to the 
development of the research. Permission was gained from all collaborators to ensure 
ethical representation of their perspectives, recordings of their work and their 
words, and confidentiality where required. In the development of my practice work, 
I wrote the script with some dramaturgical consultation from an independent 
dramaturg, Zeynep Incir. The script allowed inclusion of some original reflections 
from the two performers, Maddy Newman and Magda Matilda. In all instances 
where agreed, credit has been made to material that has come from anyone other 
than I.  
During the development of my practice work, Cyborg No Exit experiments were set 
up to test assumptions developed during previous studio work around directorial 
strategies that would work when directing human and non-human actors. This 
approach and methodological framework revealed the data outlined. The analytic 
process that I have used throughout all of my research, can best be described by 
Graeme Sullivans framework of practices used in practice-led research: theoretical 
(creating the artistic work); conceptual (giving form to thoughts); dialectic (making 
meaning through experiences); and contextual (critical forms of inquiry) (49-50). 
My research questions implemented in this PhD emerged during the development of 
these two case studies. Some of the questions were tested during those works, and 
some emerged after. Each of the experiments used in Cyborg No Exit tested the 
questions that drive this research.  
There is a paucity of scholarship about the experience of performers working with 
technological actors and how directors can strategise rehearsals to allow for this. 
Likewise, much has been written about puppetry and animating objects, but not 
about the challenges and considerations of making technological objects competent 
actors and the impact this has on human performers, especially in terms of what 
happens to actorly presence. While artists and scholars are becoming increasingly 
interested in digital performance and cyborg theatre, the scholarly writing in this 
area is almost exclusively presented from the point of view of what Susan Melrose 
calls the “expert spectator”. I have sought to present a practitioner’s perspective as a 
contribution to growing interest in this area.  
the economy of performance-making is not only un-like the economies of 
spectating, but … the economy of performance-making is internally complex, 
internally differentiated, and largely unavailable to and through spectating. 
(Melrose)  
 
As a performance maker, the task of ‘expert spectating’ is problematic. It is very 
difficult to ask questions of performance without thinking about the outcome of the 
work. Performance without outcome – without presentation to an audience – or 
divorced from an audience is absurd to me.  
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Exception   
 
 
Fig. 7 Terry Yeboah in Exception with projections from Second Life. Photo: Gorkem Acaroglu. 
 
Exception engages with the concepts of ‘bare life’ and ‘state of exception’ as outlined 
by Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben. A state of exception refers to a suspension 
of the usual rule of law as an extension of power. Exception is a performance that 
uses the multi-user online virtual world Second Life as both metaphor and tool for 
performance. As a metaphor, Second Life functions as a literal second chance at life 
for asylum seekers lucky enough to be offered a permanent home in that virtual 
world. As a site for performance, one actor on stage interacts with avatars projected 
and operated (mostly) live from Second Life. The main character, Asim is trapped 
inside Second Life where he has been detained while seeking asylum. He must go 
through a series of hoops to remain in Second Life.  
Exception has been through three stages of development, each with a public outcome. 
Here I will describe the first stage, which took place at The Storeroom Theatre in 
Melbourne in 2006, in which I proposed three possible interactions between actor 
and avatars: (1) avatars – including an avatar of the actor – operated live by actors 
who manipulate the avatar movements visibly at workstations, voicing them from 
onstage; (2) an actor interacting with pre-recorded avatars including pre-recorded 
voice; (3) the capacity for live and remote audiences to interact as avatars in Second 
Life, projected into the theatrical space.  
The desire to bring Second Life into theatrical space is a desire to ‘make present’ 
what is not present – a virtual world. Avatars are ‘given life’ by their scale of 
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projection, method of voicing and a semblance of possessing three dimensions. The 
actor onstage in Exception was immersed in an entirely animated projection world. 
All settings and characters were created from the crude two-dimensional animation 
that forms the Second Life aesthetic. It was my intention to frame the actor’s liveness 
amid an entirely animated world. I hoped that rather than overwhelming the body, 
projection integrated with the actor would blur the distinction between organic and 
mediated.  
 
With this performance, I sought to deliberately unsettle some of the core 
assumptions about dramatic theatre. My desire was to test theory in practice to 
determine whether I as a director may be able to alter the stage/audience 
relationship. By juxtaposing the actor and animation, could liveness be made more 
prevalent? The animations in Exception made no claim to being real. Could one actor 
immersed in an animation world enhance the actor’s auratic presence while at the 
same time challenging its power?  
 
Empathy and identification are perhaps the two most common tropes in the 
theorisation of dramatic theatre, and these key concepts are challenged when most 
of the characters on stage are digital. As is well known, Brecht provided an 
exhaustive critique of empathy, and defined his epic theatre as the elimination of 
empathy and imitation, although this has been challenged by David Barnett who 
pointed out that “the removal of empathy is neither desirable or fully possible” (7). 
Brecht felt that film lends itself to “a type of drama not dependent on empathy”, and 
for the audience, he claimed that the use of projections in theatre “prevent[s] his 
complete empathy, interrupt[s] his being automatically carried away” (qtd. in 
Willett 50-58). Brecht was significant in identifying traditional theatre’s reliance on 
empathy and imitation and attempting to dislocate this, however as Auslander 
noted, Brecht’s conception of the role of the actor was also based in the metaphysics 
of presence.  
In Exception, through the juxtaposition of actor with projection, I was attempting to 
introduce a degree of Brechtian estrangement. I hoped to bring the audience closer 
to the actor’s aliveness as he was surrounded by non-living entities – the animated 
avatars. I wondered if the animations’ otherness signaled the actor’s aliveness? 
Brecht’s objective to estrange the audience could also perhaps be enabled by using 
the projections to interrupt our identification with the living actor/character and 
reflect upon the fictional illusion made present.  
From its inception, Exception was conceived as a project that would enable 
interactivity from live or remote audience members via their avatars in the Second 
Life world. The idea was that the auratic present actor would engage in a three-way 
interaction with the two-dimensional avatar objects that could be operated by either 
the audience or an onstage operator. This would enable real-time interventions into 
the apparently closed fictional world that the piece otherwise constructs. Prior to 
showing the work-in-progress to an invited audience, we staged an in-world 
interactive exercise, which would feed this capacity for live intervention. One of our 
sets was a detention centre created in Second Life. We placed our main character’s 
avatar, Asim, in the virtual facility and publicised the fiction that Second Life had 
detained him. We had anarchists and communists from Sweden, Poland and 
Denmark attempting to break Asim out, which they achieved quite easily. After 
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some time with varied reactions, we enlisted a few of our more engaged rescuers to 
‘perform’ in our showing. During the section where our onstage actor and his avatar 
were locked in Second Life detention, the anarchists were to rescue our avatar, but of 
course our onstage actor remained behind bars.  
 
Fig. 8 Detention centre in Second Life. Photo: Gorkem Acaroglu. 
The participatory capabilities of Exception have not been explored to their full 
potential. However, in an effort to engage the audience’s awareness of their 
presence, I am moving the work to function as a game, giving the audience agency 
in the creation of the work. Already Exception plays with the actor’s auratic presence 
by immersing him in an animation world and introducing avatars as ‘live’ animated 
characters. Now I propose to interrupt the fictional world by enabling further 
audience interaction.  
In Exception, 2D animations are ‘made present’ through live interaction, operated 
and voiced in real time. This unsettles the notion of theatre as the privileged site of 
literal presence. The actor’s auratic presence is challenged by juxtaposition with life-
sized animated characters, and by enabling audience’s participation; the fictional 
world made-present is challenged.  
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Fig. 9 Terry Yeboah in Exception. Photo: Gorkem Acaroglu. 
Exception generated a problem, which I later addressed in my performance 
examination, Cyborg No Exit. Exception helped me understand the different 
directorial strategies that are needed for working with technological actors and 
human actors. The main actor, Terry Yeboah experienced frustration working with 
technological actors and this became something I needed to incorporate into my 
examination play to convey how important an issue the actor’s emotional experience 
is.  
I have not yet resolved the problem of the privileging of presence in digital and 
participatory performance; however, my experience of developing Exception 
changed my thoughts about the status of presence in digital theatre. By creating this 
work, I discovered that theatre could offer a rethinking of fundamental notions of 
presence to newer contemporary forms of performance that engage with electronic 
arts. Far from attacking the metaphysics of presence, I seek a way to move forward 
between conditions of possibility and impossibility.  
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The Mixed Reality Performance Lab 
 
 
Fig. 10 MRPL with performers, avatar and robot. Photo: Gorkem Acaroglu. 
 
I will now introduce a practical investigation I conducted as director with a purpose-
built industrial robot, 3D stereoscopic projection, and a live motion-capture operated 
avatar, developed for use in a 20-minute excerpt of Henrik Ibsen’s Ghosts. I led this 
investigation, which was called the Mixed Reality Performance Lab (MRPL), 
between June 2012 and June 2013, supported by the Australia Council’s Inter-Arts 
Panel Artlab Initiative. Over the year, a series of actors, other artists including visual 
artists, new media artists, dancers and animators, as well as scientists and engineers 
collaborated on various stages of the work. One actor and a set designer were 
involved over the entire course of the project. What emerged was a recognition from 
all collaborators that making a piece of theatre with technology as actor requires a 
new way of making theatre. 
The MRPL was a cross-disciplinary research lab exploring the use of live interactive 
technologies in dramatic theatre. It explored the limits and opportunities for using 
technology as subject in theatre, whereby the technology performed as an actor in a 
traditional theatre scene. It also examined the interface between bodies as subject 
and technologies as subject, wherein the technology was capable of real-time 
spontaneous interaction with actors in a dramatic theatre work.  
The MRPL comprised a series of research laboratories that developed cross-
disciplinary methodologies for human-robot interaction, avatar and real-time 
projection of virtual worlds, motion capture and 3D stereoscopic animation. This 
research took place through residencies at the Deakin Motion Capture Lab, and the 
Centre for Intelligent Systems Research. MRPL tested the use of these technologies in 
dramatic theatre with characters with whom the audience empathised, while a 
closed fictional world developed which was accessed through dialogue.  
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The project sought to investigate whether the technology is capable of real-time 
spontaneous interaction with humans on stage; it also attempted to determine how 
cross-disciplinary performance could incorporate narrative and other elements of 
the dramatic theatre craft. The specific aims were: 
• To utilise live interactive technologies in dramatic theatre, so they induce 
empathy. These are live in the sense that they are operated live and 
interactive in the sense that actors on stage are operating them and interacting 
with the technologies.  
• To employ live interactive technologies so that they ‘speak’ and develop the 
fictional world being played out on stage.  
The collaborators were asked to consider the following key questions. Is it possible 
to maintain the fundamentals of dramatic theatre, and use new media technologies 
at the same time? Can audiences empathise with character and plot when 
technology ‘acts’? Can the dramatic world be created through dialogue and sustain a 
closed fictional world while integrating technology with actors on stage? 
  
Results of the research were presented in 2013 at the International Symposium of 
Electronic Arts (ISEA) in Sydney. The research took place in four phases. Phase one, 
facilitated in the UK by the British Council, involved consultations with international 
experts to identify preliminary assumptions. Phase two involved practical 
laboratories with artists who had extensive histories working with new technologies, 
enabling a process of sampling and comparing. Phase three comprised two practice-
based fieldwork laboratory residencies. Finally, phase four involved presentation 
and evaluation of our findings as a showing called Robots, Avatars and Ghosts (see 
figure 11 below). 
 
Fig. 11 Audience at MRPL showing. Photo: Gorkem Acaroglu. 
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MRPL demonstrated to me that when technologies are actors, even if their role 
contributes to the mission of dramatic theatre, the fundamentals of dramatic theatre 
are altered. The very appearance of high-tech devices breaks the illusion of the 
dramatic world. While the MRPL was a great experiment, in many ways the work 
failed as a piece of theatre. I will now proceed to unpack some of the important 
discoveries made about acting, which eventually led me to perform myself in order 
to understand the strategies human actors might need from a director when making 
cyborg theatre works.  
While the project was interested in anthropomorphising the technology, we were not 
seeking to make audiences believe that these technologies were human. I did not 
want to push the robot and avatar to the limits of humanness, so that they reached 
the uncanny valley.7 I was more interested in how un-human these technologies 
could be while still allowing us to empathise and engage with them. I was interested 
in a robot being lifelike in behaviour, albeit not in appearance, so that audiences 
could treat it as a sentient being.  
One of the first points made by one of the MRPL actors was that acting is about 
reacting. He went on to explain that the fundamental difference he perceived 
between technology/media and humans is the human capacity to respond 
spontaneously. In his view, a technology could not be described as ‘acting’ unless it 
had that capacity. This actor’s question for technology and media was quite clear: 
“Can a medium or technology be programmed to select from a number of responses 
randomly so that the actor does not know which response she will get, and therefore 
her ‘acting’ will not become robotic?” This became a crucial question for our first 
week’s investigation. Essentially this actor was asking whether he could have an 
‘intentional system’ to work with, where the media or technological actors could 
select an appropriate reaction based on a repertoire of expressive actions, as did the 
MIT researchers discussed in chapter one. It was during the MRPL that the question 
arose for me, do technological actors need to be actually live or can they just 
simulate liveness? During the MRPL I pushed for the technology to be live, 
responsive and autonomous, and consistently faced the roboticists comments that 
this could easily be simulated and therefore be much more reliable. The question 
continued for me during the current research. One audience member at the MRPL 
showing was disappointed that he was not told that the robot, Mrs Alving, was 
autonomously moving across stage, triggered by the actor’s voice. He felt that this 
knowledge would have made a big difference to the manner in which he received 
the showing if he had known prior to seeing the work.  
I asked the actors, “When would you consider technology to be a co-actor?” We 
came up with the following four principles: 
1. The technology would need to have some form of communication capacity. 
2. The technology would need to appear to be reacting to the human actors. 

7 The uncanny valley effect is a theoretical concept first proposed by Japanese roboticist Masahiro Mori. It refers 
to the phenomenon that occurs when a robot – or 3D animation – is so close to human, but not perfectly so, that it 
causes a feeling of revulsion in the human viewer. Mori’s original hypothesis, which has not been tested, was 
that as the robot’s appearance becomes more human, a human observer’s emotional response becomes 
increasingly empathic until a certain point is reached when the response becomes revulsion. But when the 
robot’s appearance becomes less distinguishable from a human, the emotional response is positive again and 
becomes similar to human-to-human empathy levels. The ‘valley’ is the dip in the graph that occurs when 
humans become uncomfortable with the robot’s human likeness (Masahiro).   
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3. The technology would need to have an appearance of life. 
4. The technology would need to appear to express emotion.  
 
As is evident from this list, the technology would only need to appear to achieve 
these principles rather than to actually achieve them. One actor made the point that 
when a performer expresses an emotion, we have no way of knowing if they are in 
fact experiencing that emotion; thus, whether they do experience it or not is in fact 
irrelevant. Essentially, an actor also simulates emotion, just as performing animals 
and puppets are made to do. The only difference is that the human performer 
directly expresses her simulated emotion, whereas the puppet, performing animal or 
technological object is a tool employed to simulate emotion.  
Psychologists Jenny Yield and Bundy Mackintosh have identified three 
characteristics of an emotional episode: 
1. Behaviours that can be studied empirically as they are visible to others; 
2. Bodily physiological responses that can also be measured;  
3. Feelings, which are private and subjective (qtd. in Braisby and Gellatly 464-
465).  
 
A medium or a technology can simulate the first two characteristics and then the 
third remains private and subjective, just as it does for humans or circus animals. As 
long as a media or technology displays the behaviours of emotion and ‘bodily 
responses’ as appropriate, then does it matter what it is feeling? Certainly, I would 
describe them as technological actors if they displayed the behaviours of emotion 
and reaction.  
Communication, reaction and expression of emotion are all key ingredients in the 
actor’s tool kit used to induce empathy in an audience. In a discussion around 
technology’s capacity to induce empathy, I came up with the following key methods 
to achieve this: 
1. The human actors must treat the technology/media actor as living.  
2. The physical mannerisms/animation of the technology/media must appear 
to express emotion and reaction.  
 
The cyborg is a hybrid – half human and half machine. In constructing a cyborg 
theatre, it is necessary that the humans transfer some of their humanness to the 
machine. This line of thinking mirrors those acting theories mentioned at the start of 
this study:  as Stanislavski argued, the actor “must fit his own human qualities to the 
life of this other person, and pour into it all of his own soul” (11-12). In a way, the 
technology and media becomes the ‘character’ which the actor ‘fills’ with her soul.  
 
Questions of consciousness, actually feeling emotions, and intentionality plague 
philosophical discourse around artificial intelligence (AI), as much as they do acting 
discourse. AI Professor Geoffrey Jefferson believes that:  
Not until a machine could write a sonnet or compose a concerto because of 
thoughts and emotions felt, and not by the chance fall of symbols, could we 
agree that machine equals brain – that is, not only write it but know that it 
had written it. (qtd. in Russell and Norvig 952)  
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Just as Stanislavski insisted that actors “must live it by actually experiencing feelings 
that are analogous to it, each and every time you repeat the process of creating it” 
(11-12), there are those who argue for actual intelligence, as opposed to simulated 
intelligence, within AI, as noted above. I had hoped that our robot would have the 
capacity for some level of intelligence, at least the capacity to select from a series of 
emotional responses, but the practicalities of robotics were disappointing.  
 
 
Fig. 12 Mrs Alving, the robot. Photo: Gorkem Acaroglu.  
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The Labs 
At the Centre for Intelligent Systems Research (CISR), robots and avatars are a chief 
subject of investigation. There we were able to consider what would be a realistic 
expectation of a robot. The engineers and scientists we met strongly advised us to 
consider using semi-autonomous robots, as they described their mechanical friends – 
none of which are humanoid, and all of which are developed for use in industry – as 
unpredictable and dangerous.8 They articulated this fundamental question to me for 
the first time, which I have carried through to this PhD research: “Does it matter if a 
robot is actually autonomous or can we just give the impression of autonomy?” A 
puppeteered robot or avatar would be much more reliable than an autonomous one 
and an audience would not be able to tell the difference. 
In the motion capture lab, what we were testing was the use of live motion capture 
of an avatar to make it present. Its perceived liveness for an audience came from the 
physically present human in a motion capture suit and the live relationship between 
their body and the virtual character. When the human performer moved, the avatar 
also moved.  
 
Fig. 13 Human performer, avatar and 3D projections. Photo: Kim Vincs. 
We looked at using 3D projections as set and the correlation between the onstage 
real objects and virtual objects. Objects could be mapped to 3D projected set objects, 
so that when an actor who was operating an avatar sat on a chair, it appeared as if 
her avatar was sitting on the virtual chair. When an actor not in a motion capture 
suit moved an object that was mapped, it appeared in the virtual set to be moving on 

8 Semi-autonomous robots would be triggered by an operator and then be able to carry out a series of actions, 
whereas an autonomous robot would be entirely triggered to act from on-stage inputs such as an actor’s voice.  
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its own. The relationship between the virtual world and the real world became most 
interesting in these moments, when there was a direct interaction between the two.  
 
Fig. 14 Actors with robot and avatars. Photo: Gorkem Acaroglu.  
In our first dramaturgical week, we had asked the question: is the technology doing 
what actors can do, or is it trying to act and do what the actors cannot? In the case of 
the robot, we selected a role so that the technology was only doing what the actors 
could do, just replacing them; but in the case of the avatar and 3D projections, the 
technology was doing what the actors couldn’t do. Both the robot and the avatars 
took on the qualities of subject technology and performed as actors on stage with 
human bodies. As creator of the work, I constructed these technological actors’ 
performances, by simulating emotion through voice, gesture, and proximity to 
bodies, size and intentionality. I was seeking to understand when a technology or 
media could be considered an actor, which led to my current PhD research. 
Conclusion 
The most powerful aspect of using these technologies is the crossover between the 
virtual and real worlds, or between the human and technological worlds – the 
cyborg human/machine crossover. The MRPL clarified for me that in order for these 
technologies to contribute to human actors auratic presence, the actors and text must 
remain intact. The technology must be connected to a human and function as a 
conduit for the human. 
Throughout directing Exception and MRPL I was challenged to find ways to direct 
both human and nonhuman actors so that the auratic presence of the humans was 
not undermined by the technology (they did not become robots) but at the same 
time the technology was empowered to the role of actor. Many questions were 
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raised for me in developing both works, which eventually led me to focus on finding 
directorial strategies in this research.   
My examination performance, Cyborg No Exit, which I will discuss in the next 
chapter, constitutes an attempt to address the problems and issues that I 
encountered around the actor’s relationship to technology over a decade, but most 
specifically through my work on Exception and the MRPL. It does this through 
performance because the embodied experience of grappling with issues of presence 
can reveal new knowledge to the creative artist that scholarly analysis alone cannot. 
In many ways, my most important discoveries concerning directing human and non-
human actors within cyborg theatre came from my practical engagement with actors 
and technology as both an actor and a director, described in this chapter and the 
next.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
In this chapter, I analyse my play, Cyborg No Exit, in order to articulate how 
interactions between bodies and technologies – including projections, technological 
objects and robots – unsettle concepts of theatrical presence – auratic, literal and 
fictional presence, leading me to formulate directorial strategies from an expert 
spectator perspective. On April 9, 10 and 11, 2015, I presented my PhD examination 
performance, Cyborg No Exit, at the Mechanics Institute in Brunswick. This creative 
research presentation dramatised the key scholarly and intellectual challenges I 
encountered during the course of my PhD research and my work as a creative artist.  
I used the dramatic structure of Jean Paul Sartre’s play No Exit as a template that 
enabled me to organise my research findings in a creative medium.9 In this way, my 
play is similar to Brecht’s 1942 work The Messingkauf Dialogues – a dialogic work that 
presents Brecht’s theoretical ideas about modern drama in a dramatic form. The 
Messingkauf Dialogues is perhaps the most famous example of a work that utilises the 
conventions of drama to articulate theoretical problems and dramaturgical aporia. 
Whereas Brecht stages a four-way dialogue between key stakeholders in the theatre, 
I staged a dialogue between the competing and sometimes contradictory roles I had 
to perform as a creative practitioner within an academic institution, that of director, 
PhD student, and performer. 
So, Cyborg No Exit is a hybrid form, which draws on Brechtian dramaturgy and 
Sartre’s most famous play. I used Sartre’s No Exit in the following ways:  
1. The script was literally used as a framework for the performance; 
2. It used the themes and philosophical questions posed in the original script as 
a metaphor for the practical and theoretical problems generated by the 
technologies used in Cyborg Theatre;  
3. It mapped the characters from Sartre’s play onto three aspects of my own 
identity as a theatre practitioner – director, researcher, actor – that debated 
different conceptions of energy and presence with reference to technological 
actors. 
My work sought to articulate, as Cormac Power puts it, theatre’s capacity to 
“explore and ‘play’ with notions of presence” (118). This chapter will begin by 
describing my creative process with a focus on the relationships between Sartre’s 
play and my own before going on to analyse a number of key scenes in Cyborg No 
Exit with specific reference to bodies, technology and presence. 
No Exit 
In November 2014, also as part of my research, I performed in a professional public 
production of No Exit at The Mechanics Institute in Brunswick. I played the 
character Inez with co-actors Artemis Ioannides (Estelle), Erick Mitsak (Garcin) and 
Tariro Mavondo (Valet), directed by Greg Ulfan. I chose to perform as an actor 
myself in order to understand the specific tasks an actor performs to construct 
fictional presence as outlined by Power, and how an actor’s auratic presence 
functions in relation to the audience. As someone with limited experience as an 

9 No Exit was selected for a number of reasons: 1) The play lends itself to a debate between characters. 2) It is set 
in one location. 3) The philosophical concepts Sartre grapples with in this work were relevant to my research (see 
below).  
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actor, I felt it necessary to perform in a professional theatre production to gain 
greater insight into the acting process. In order to develop directorial strategies for 
actors, I felt I needed to understand fundamentally the experience of being an actor, 
taking direction, being on stage in front of an audience and working with other 
human actors.   
The experience of working on this play inspired me to use Sartre’s work to ground 
my examination performance since No Exit resonates thematically and 
philosophically with my experience of engaging in scholarly research from the 
position of a creative artist. Before outlining the salient features of Cyborg No Exit, it 
is necessary to say something about Sartre’s play. 
Sartre writes extensively about existence (Being) and bad faith; I co-opted these 
concepts and used the philosophical themes of No Exit as metaphors in my 
production. Sartre’s fundamental premise is often summarised by the phrase, 
‘existence before essence’. Although Sartre uses an archaic ‘universal male’ address, 
he is describing a humanity that encompasses everyone, not only men. Sartre 
explains: “What do we mean by saying that existence precedes essence? We mean 
that man first of all exists, encounters himself, surges up in the world – and defines 
himself afterwards” (349). In simple terms, Sartre believes there is no core or essence 
to humans. Nothing precedes us: “to begin with he is nothing. He will not be 
anything until later, and then he will be what he makes of himself ” (349).  
In short, we are what we do. We construct ourselves through the life choices we 
make. Sartre’s existentialism held that every decision we make reflects a particular 
view for all humanity. If I choose to marry then I am stating that all people should be 
monogamous, because people only choose what they value as the best thing, and 
what I choose for myself therefore must be a judgement about what is best for all. 
Sartre argues, “I am thus responsible for myself and for all men, and I am creating a 
certain image of man as I would have him to be. In fashioning myself I fashion man” 
(350).  
Sartre felt that if God does not exist, then everything is permitted, which means that 
people have no excuse for not doing something: “For if indeed existence precedes 
essence, one will never be able to explain one’s action by reference to a given and 
specific human nature; in other words, there is no determinism – man is free, man is 
freedom” (353). How you choose to deal with what happens to you is up to you. 
Sartre believed that one is “nothing else but the sum of his actions” (358), or as Inez 
says in No Exit, “You are what you do and nothing else.” Sartre uses the example of 
Racine: “Why should we attribute to Racine the capacity to write yet another tragedy 
when that is precisely what he did not write?” (359) If a person is nothing more than 
their actions then we are as other people see us, not as we imagine ourselves to be.  
Sartre’s version of ‘I think therefore I am’ pertains to oneself in the presence of the 
other, “and we are just as certain of the other as we are of ourselves” (361). One 
cannot be anything unless the other recognises them as such. If we imagine life 
inside a prison, it is easy to understand Sartre’s notion of the Other: without 
distractions, one is faced with oneself and the view of oneself by others. The concept 
of freedom is coupled with ‘bad faith’ where we pretend or ignore the fact that we 
are free.  
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Sartre’s play, No Exit, conveys these sometimes difficult and dense philosophical 
concepts in an accessible dramatic form. The play takes place in Hell, and it is in this 
play that Sartre dramatised his view that it is conflict that epitomises being with 
others (Cox 132). Three dead people – Garcin, Inez and Estelle – are locked in a room 
together, forcing them to face one another and therefore themselves. The characters 
proceed to irritate one another, growing increasingly suspicious of the others and 
the situation (Cox 134). Inez eventually confronts the other two who deny there is 
any reason why they should be in hell. This leads her to the realisation that there is 
no need for a torturer in hell because the inhabitants will torture one another.  
This knowledge leads them to agree to remain silent to avoid torture, but the silence 
doesn’t last long as Estelle needs a mirror to see herself. Inez offers to be her mirror, 
but Estelle finds the tiny reflection in Inez’s eyes to be inadequate. Inez soon realises 
she can torture Estelle by lying about how she looks. Estelle, though, wants Garcin’s 
admiration, which annoys Inez and sets up the antagonistic dynamic between the 
three characters for the remainder of the play. As the play progresses, each character 
unsuccessfully seeks the validation of their identity from one of the others. 
Eventually the door opens but no one will leave. The characters realise their power 
over one another and their lack of power over the other’s gaze, which leads Garcin 
to announce, “Hell is other people.”  
The mirror scene is a perfect example of Sartre’s concept of being-for-others. Inez 
offers to be Estelle’s mirror but Estelle does not trust Inez as her mirror. She needs a 
mirror to see how others see her. “A real mirror can distort but it cannot lie as Inez 
does” (Cox 137). Even if Inez tells the truth, Estelle does not know if this is true or 
not.  
 
Fig. 15 Performing in No Exit with co-actors Artemis Ioannides and Erick Mitsak. Photo: Deryk McAlpin. 
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The concept of bad faith is also a key theme in No Exit. Garcin, for example, has a 
very ambiguous relationship to his cowardice but a very clear idea of his aim to be a 
hero, “Thus, he wishes to avoid confronting the pattern of his past actions … and 
chooses instead to define himself in terms of his aspirations” (Detmer 147).  
Garcin seeks confirmation of this image of himself from Estelle, to no avail, as Estelle 
does not care if he is a coward. Garcin thinks that if he had had more time he would 
have achieved what he intended. Sartre describes this as bad faith – using 
“inconsistent standards of evidence” (Detmer 149). 
In No Exit the characters are dead and therefore they no longer have the ability to 
change how the Other sees them, so in death their judgement is eternal. While we 
are alive, though, we have the capacity to be more than what we are. Unlike the 
dead, we are free. 
Cyborg No Exit 
In my PhD production, the characters are not located in hell as they are in No Exit; 
rather they are in a theatre space. Theatre is metaphorically hell because it is the site 
where actors, directors and other creative artists seek to seduce the audience, 
without being able to change how the Other (the audience) see them. The concept of 
being trapped in hell by ‘other people’ was also used as a metaphor for the 
experience of writing a PhD as a creative artist. I often felt as though I was engaged 
in three very different modes of knowledge creation. My task has been that of a 
practitioner seeking to use the methods of ‘expert-spectating’ on my own work. 
Over the years, I have developed my own set of dramaturgical and rehearsal 
strategies that enable me to make theatre works. As a doctoral student I was 
required to engage with a body of scholarly knowledge that required a different skill 
set and approach to creative work. I decided to present my research findings in a 
dramatic mode since my project is primarily about finding strategies to create 
cyborg theatre while working with theatrical presence, therefore I felt my research 
needed to be expressed in both a creative and scholarly register.  
Cyborg No Exit investigated the relationships between human and technological 
actors in theatre, utilising everyday and to a large extent, conventional technologies. 
Everyday technologies were used because the work was about making technologies 
(that lend themselves to performance) into actors, and not about using cutting-edge 
technologies to perform. The technologies used were a pre-recorded video of myself 
played on a TV monitor, a live video feed of co-actress Maddy Newman, and a robot 
vacuum that was modified for the production, so its movement could be operated 
remotely and accurately by offstage operator Magda Miranda. The robot created by 
the Centre for Intelligent Systems research for the MRPL – as discussed in the 
previous chapter – also made a brief appearance at the end of the work.  
I selected a robot vacuum as an actor in this work to represent an everyday robotic 
technology that could interact with humans. This decision was an acknowledgement 
of a future in which our daily lives will be more integrated with robotic technologies 
with varying degrees of performed subjectivity. My view is that placing robots and 
avatars in theatre productions can allow us to play out our future possible 
relationships with these technologies.  
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In Cyborg No Exit a PhD student – a version of myself, played by Maddy Newman – 
attends rehearsals of No Exit as part of her research. The director – played by me, 
live on stage – is unhappy with the PhD student’s presence in the rehearsal room. 
The director is hoping to adapt No Exit and incorporate technology as actor in the 
work, which is the reason that the PhD student is in attendance. The director has 
prepared a pre-recorded video character to perform in the work, and as the 
scheduled actress does not arrive, she co-opts the PhD student to perform with the 
technology. The pre-recorded video – played by me – is constructed as a character 
with subjectivity. The director soon tires of her lack of spontaneity and instead uses 
a live video feed of the PhD student. The director eventually also tires of this, at 
which point the PhD student recommends using the robot vacuum she encountered 
on her entrance. The robot vacuum – also constructed as a character with subjectivity 
– wants to perform without any human actors, which the PhD student facilitates as 
revenge against the rude director. This time it is the PhD student who becomes 
frustrated with the technology.  
In Cyborg No Exit the different aspects of myself constantly reinterpreted the work 
depending on which version I was. The work changed from creative process, to 
research to artefact. For this reason I chose to present my work as a dramatic 
dialogue in order to dramatise these tensions. In No Exit, Sartre explores the notion 
of having one’s subjectivity be dependent on the Other and the conflict that emerges 
when trying to consolidate one’s sense of self from the other. Every attempt at good 
faith falls into an instance of bad faith. This is like the cyclical nature of my research 
– as I seek to make technology subject it comes into conflict with the human other 
and visa versa.  
As previously discussed, the fiction made-present by the various technologies in 
Cyborg No Exit articulated the relationships that the technology had to the human 
bodies. These were conducted as a series of experiments that may or may not have 
been received by an audience in terms of presence. My descriptions of the following 
scenes are not authoritative accounts, but rather function as a method of articulating 
the issues of presence that must be addressed when directing cyborg theatre works.  
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Experiment 1: Live video feed and human interaction  
 
Fig. 16 Maddy Newman and Görkem Acaroglu with live video feed. Photo: Glenn D’Cruz.  
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In the first live video scene of Cyborg No Exit, I was experimenting with strategies 
required to make a simple technology subject in cyborg theatre. Parker-Starbuck has 
noted, that “technology as simple as a live video feed can become subject … as it 
gains agency and centrality, becoming an integral component of the work merging 
with bodies on stage” (Cyborg Theatre 2003 50). In this scene, the staging portrayed 
Sartre’s intimate mirror scene from No Exit, via interaction between a massive 
projected head and a small human body.  
 
This scene had the potential for the technology to take away from the human’s 
presence on stage by overwhelming it, and needed to be directed in such a way that 
this did not occur. Live feed is one of the more common uses of digital media in 
performance where “the audience is confronted with both the original actor and 
their live image within the same space” (Kilch and Scheer 94). This juxtaposition of 
the projected image and the live body being projected creates meaning through their 
collision. Every small movement and gesture that the actor makes signifies 
something much bigger in the projected version; her gestures are amplified. Fewster 
describes this type of interaction as a technique that “signifies an intermedial 
presence between the live performer and their mediatised referent, resulting in a 
signifying body” (Relationship 49). Fewster predominantly describes this interaction 
as bodies ‘quoting’ gestures from projected media; however, this notion of quoting 
also applies the other way. The live projected video as a medium quotes from the 
physical gestures of the live performer. Newman’s ‘character’ (which in this scene is 
a character playing another character) becomes a demonstration as we watch the 
actor ‘perform’ the projected and signified role.  
I directed the action simply in order to gain most effect from the live voice 
performing in real time with the projected video image of the performer. This was a 
kind of puppeteering as the projection functioned as the puppet of the performer 
being projected, a displaced interaction. Maddy Newman, who performed the live 
feed in Cyborg No Exit, explained that she could not be subjective about her own 
performance because the projection was such a visual mechanism which she could 
never see, so she had to trust the outside eye. This requires the director to take 
responsibility for some of the functions that an actor would normally take on when 
developing their own role. The actor cannot subjectively decide whether a gesture or 
physical action conveys the scene accurately – they must rely on the director 
objectively providing this information.  
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Experiment 2: The pre-recorded video and human interaction 
 
 
 
Fig. 17 Maddy Newman with pre-recorded video in Cyborg No Exit. Photo: Glenn D’Cruz.  
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The pre-recorded video bust of myself, played back on a television monitor, had a 
‘quasi presence’ that was hyperreal (Relationship 61). This pre-recorded version of 
myself was different to the ‘me’ presented onstage and resonates with Fewster’s 
description of the hyperbody where “the power of media to mass replicate digital 
images of the body that are able to multiply streamed into the performance space” 
(Relationship 42). Performing with and directing the pre-recorded video, my natural 
inclination was to perfect the timing and then to focus on character and the 
dynamics of the scene. This had also been my process working on the MRPL. In both 
works, the actors found the process the reverse of what they were accustomed to and 
expressed a need to rethink their expectations. 
Oriza Hirata, director of Sayonara, is interesting to consider in relation to timing. A 
realistic handling of time is crucial to Hirata’s work: 
Robots are more precise so you can give them, for example, a pause of 0.01 
seconds and they will do that. So as a director you expect much more in terms 
of timing. And also the directions are very practical, not sort of abstract. (qtd. 
in “Robots”) 
Like Hirata, I found working with the pre-recorded video refreshing both as a 
director and a performer. Performing with a pre-recorded video is more comfortable 
for me than working with an actor who might not do the same thing each time. For 
practiced actors working with pre-recorded video can be frustrating and this needs 
to be taken into consideration when directing scenes with actors and pre-recorded 
technologies. Explaining the process and requirements prior to commencing 
rehearsal can assist in realigning expectations. For me though, knowing what the 
performer opposite me will do, and being able to trust that, is comforting, as a non-
performer. In our early rehearsals of No Exit when I played Inez, I found my co-
actor, Les Simpson, to be very robotic in his performance. He described his process 
as “locking it in on a cellular level”, which meant that his delivery was the same 
every time, almost as if it were pre-recorded. However, as he is human and not a 
machine, he could always choose to deliver his role differently; he has freedom, 
which left me feeling enslaved to his will. I preferred the unpredictability of a 
technology to that of a human. The technology could malfunction, but the human 
had all the power to deliver his role unpredictably each time. The unpredictability 
that comes from theatre’s live quality is an aspect that could be preferred by some 
actors, especially over film. As a strategy, I found discussion with the actors was 
useful, in order to understand their preference – unpredictability or precision. Also 
defining when rehearsal was for timing and precision, and when rehearsal was for 
characterisation and discovery was necessary. Ensuring that time was set aside for 
both of these was very useful.  
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Experiment 3:The robot vacuum and human interaction  
 
Fig. 18 Maddy Newman with Robot Vacuum in Cyborg No Exit. Photo: Glenn D’Cruz.  
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The scenes between the robot vacuum and human performers were experiments in 
directing an object to connect with humans and make present a fictional character 
that interacted with the human actors’ characters. My directorial focus was around 
the robot vacuum’s capacity to move beyond its pure machine-ness, and make 
present a fictional robot-character. In order to do this I questioned whether the robot 
vacuum functioned as an actor, a puppet or a prop in this work. The definition of a 
puppet put forward by David Currell – “an inanimate object moved in a dramatic 
manner” (9) by human agency – describes the robot vacuum in this work. However 
John Barchum, General Manager of the Creature Technology Company – creators of 
the incredible animatronic dinosaur puppets in Walking with Dinosaurs – claimed in 
an interview I conducted, that a robot is a machine and not an object that has been 
created by human hands, therefore it cannot ‘speak back’ and be the conduit for 
human expression as a puppet can. While audiences are happy to accept wire and 
gauze as a real horse, for example in the National Theatre and Handspring Puppet 
Theatre’s War Horse, a robot vacuum playing itself is not asking us to imagine it as 
materially something else, but rather to just go along with its fictional character.  
When watching the robot vacuum in Cyborg No Exit the audience was being asked to 
engage their imagination in a fictional character that had desires, motivation and 
agency. In this sense, the robot vacuum is a robot-actor playing a robot-character in 
the same way that a human-actor plays a human-character. However the robot 
vacuum is an actor only in that sense otherwise it is a puppet because a person 
operates its movement and voice. Because its movements and voice are pre-recorded 
and played back in the show, the machine is also similar to a prop.  
The robot vacuum’s interaction with Newman and I as co-actors was problematic in 
a number of ways. The vacuum’s body was not anthropomorphic. It required us to 
look at the floor to appear to communicate with it, which was, arguably, obstructive 
to the audience since this proxemic relationship masked our faces. As actors we 
attempted to endow the vacuum with our emotions, however if the audience could 
not see our faces, then this was going to be difficult to convey. The robot vacuum 
also had limited movement. It could not gesture or make facial expressions so its 
only capacity to engage an audience emotionally – to empathise – was via movement 
and its pre-recorded voice. There was a level of ‘liveness’, though, to the robot’s 
performance, since every line it spoke was triggered by the operator, so unlike the 
pre-recorded video it could be responsive in real time, and its movements were 
operated by Miranda, who could also respond to us as actors.  
By performing with the robot, I was able to feel empathy for it as a character, which 
enabled me as director to translate its fiction. In theatre, though, how long can we 
‘play’ into the make-believe of the onstage role, without reflecting upon the 
vacuum’s actual robot self, its robot-presence? In film we do not think about the 
materiality of the robot character because the robot is not physically present in the 
room with us, whereas in theatre, we share the space with the robot. Its ‘reality’ is 
very present. The juxtaposition of the robot alongside the human can raise questions 
around the fiction because of the nature of the technology’s materiality.  
The robot vacuum is a robot vacuum, just as a woman in a painting is a woman in a 
painting. However in my play, the robot vacuum was pretending to be Robby with a 
backstory and desire, in the same way an actor in a play pretends. The separation 
between the medium and the artistic expression was as present as with a human 
actor. As a director in this instance, I sought strategies that I used to create character 
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as an actor in No Exit and then directed the robot’s movements and timing to assist 
with the construction of character. I also sought engagement from the other actors to 
assist with endowing the robot vacuum with its status and function within the scene.   
Auratic Presence 
D’Cruz describes what makes an actor watchable (to have auratic presence in 
Power’s terms) as “the exchange of looks between actors and actors, and between 
actors and spectators … as a result of the actors doing something on stage” (282). He 
concludes that in theatre this works best when the actors seek to seduce the 
audience’s gaze, to “produce a quality of energy or ‘presence’ that ‘touches’ the 
audience” (D’Cruz 282). One directorial strategy I employed in Cyborg No Exit when 
directing the nonhuman actors, was to spatially position and gesturally inform the 
technological objects and projections in such a way that attempted to seduce the 
audience. For example, Mrs Alving is watchable; we want to see her, what she can 
do, largely because she is novel, but as a director I sought to strategise her 
watchability to touch the audience.  
There was a distinct scene in Cyborg No Exit that explored questions of aura and 
auratic presence. In this scene my co-actor, Maddy Newman, ran around the space 
performing various strenuous exercises as she spoke scholarly text from Cormac 
Power about auratic presence. The point being made was that when something is 
going on for an actor – in this case, a very physical and present exhaustion of the 
body – it makes an audience want to watch them. This is achieved in some acting 
techniques by the actor performing a psychological action such as begging, pleading, 
and so on. Here it was a literal activity, which affected the actor in a physical and 
highly visible way, infecting her auratice presence.  
During my performance in Cyborg No Exit I came to understand that an actor 
reduces everyday movements to create a synthesised movement vocabulary. This is 
a strategy to engage the spectator, creating a kind of magnetism, which is perhaps an 
instance of auratic presence. Fewster’s notion of the aesthetic body recognises that the 
trained body of the actor is what works on an audience to create this kind of 
presence for them. Both performers in Cyborg No Exit experienced performing with 
the technology as a kind of ‘retraining’ especially around the construction of their 
movement vocabulary. The juxtaposition of the human actor alongside technology 
created an aesthetic body – one that was retrained by the technology with which it 
performed. This in turn challenged the actors’ auratic presence as it undermined the 
training with which they arrived. The actors’ training and capacity to work against 
“daily behaviour” or socially inscribed “personality” (Power 77) was compromised 
by the retraining that the technology required. This could be described as a kind of 
‘dumbing down’ of the human performer. When juxtaposing bodies with technology 
as actor, the technology often requires the performance of the human to be 
simplified. As mentioned, Maddy Newman described her experience of working 
with the pre-recorded video as initially locking her performance in so she could not 
play or make new discoveries as she would normally.  
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Fig. 19 Pre-recorded video, live video feed and robot vacuum. Photo: Glenn D’Cruz.   
In Cyborg No Exit the technology dominated one scene, in which all the technologies  
– vacuum, pre-recorded video on the TV monitor and the live feed – performed 
simultaneously. In this moment the three technologies performed the scene from No 
Exit in which Inez realises that torturers are not necessary in hell as the characters 
will torture one another. On one level I was interested to explore whether 
technology as actor could present Sartre’s being-for others while also reflecting on the 
liveness debate and therefore I directed the scene devoid of human presence. In this 
scene I sought to find directorial strategies to animate technological objects and 
projections’ presence without juxtaposition amongst humans. This scene in 
particular reiterated for me that juxtaposition with humans is an essential aspect of 
making technological actors.  
Conclusion 
Cyborg No Exit was a practice-led-research presentation of my exploration of the 
practical and philosophical implications of creating cyborg theatre, of integrating 
human actors with technological actors and finding directorial strategies to make 
competent actors from these technologies. I took the proposition of ‘subject 
technology’, articulated by Jennifer Parker-Starbuck, as a point of departure for 
grappling with the problems human actors encounter when working with 
technological actors. I believe that this mode of analysis reveals things that are 
masked by conventional analysis, which looks at theatrical processes from the point 
of view of the critic/analyst/spectator. Cyborg/No Exit staged the tensions within me 
as a practitioner in the academy. I was compelled to perform the role of academic, 
performer and director to engage with my research question, hence I wrote three 
characters that were aspects of myself. Moreover, these characters have competing 
and sometimes contradictory functions, which, ultimately, are to be ratified by 
others – that is, by the audience. This is why Hell is Theatre.  
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Cyborg No Exit presented a series of experiments that engaged with the 
body/technology interaction in cyborg theatre. These interactions took the form of 
four experiments, all made present the fictional world of the play, while the 
technologies challenged and problematised the actors’ auratic presence and posed 
questions around the technologies’ own aura. The literal audience presence was 
highlighted in three key moments of the work. The various interactions between 
body and technology could be described using Fewster’s four conceptions of the 
body, these being phenomenological, signified, aesthetic and hyperbody. The aesthetic 
body’s interaction with the technology was most problematic for the human actors, as 
the technology retrained the actors and challenged their auratic presence.  
Research Findings 
This study has demonstrated how a range of computer-based robotic agents 
(projected alter egos, avatars, anthropomorphic robots, non-anthropomorphic 
robots) can be animated on a stage through the following methods: 1) by being 
placed in close proximity to human actors and interacting with human actors; 2) by 
anthropomorphising the robot agents through the use of sound technologies; 3) by 
allowing a level of improvisation with pre-recorded technologies to simulate 
‘liveness’; 4) by enabling operation of the robot agents from on stage by the human 
actors; and 5) by allowing the human actors to perform through the technological 
actors.  
 
The study has also revealed how a director can set up a live, augmented reality, 
and/or virtual reality stage; how the presence of non-human actors alters the space, 
time, and interactivity between agents on stage, and between those agents and the 
audience; how use of non-human actors can replicate a culture in which interaction 
via and with augmented and virtual reality technologies is becoming more and more 
ubiquitous; the demand on and strategies deployed by directors working with non-
human actors. It has raised the question as to whether current computer and robotic 
technology is sophisticated enough at this stage to become more than a puppet 
animated by a human actor.  
 
Below is a description of my specific discoveries for directing human and non-
human actors in cyborg theatre. This section demonstrates how the theoretical, 
conceptual and case research explored above has generated replicable findings that 
have been tested and retested in cycles of practice (through Exception, then MRPL), 
and articulated in my final examinable practice of Cyborg No Exit. These findings 
seek to assist a field of fellow directors of ‘cyborg theatre’ who want to work with 
both human and non-human actors to generate presence, interest, and relationships 
with each other and the audience in a stage performance.  
Restructured rehearsal process 
• A different process of making theatre is required to create cyborg theatre, 
especially because of the impact on the human actors. Terry Yeboah, who 
performed in Exception, explained to me that trying to find the emotional 
truth of the character to create the world of the piece was extremely difficult 
to do in rehearsal with the technology. For a work that requires actors to go to 
difficult emotional terrain, the technological requirements need to be 
separated from the actors’ explorations. A traditional rehearsal period in 
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Australia is four weeks full-time. The first week is spent analysing the script, 
breaking it into units and intellectually understanding the characters. The 
second week is usually spent exploring the world of the play and the 
characters and their relationships. In the third week, the director will start to 
lock in the blocking, the spatial positions of the actors and the actors will 
usually settle on their decisions around character and relationships. The 
fourth week consists of full runs and bringing the whole work together. The 
process that I have come to through working on Exception, the MRPL and 
Cyborg No Exit would require the second and third weeks to be reversed, 
where the technology is introduced in the second week and all blocking is 
finalised, privileging requirements of the technology. Once this is done, the 
third week could give time to the actor to make discoveries around character 
and the world, taking their cue from the blocking.  
• When working on a specific scene, it is useful to divide the rehearsal time into 
‘technical time’ and ‘human-actor focused time’ which allows for exploration, 
discovery and unpredictability, none of which is relevant for a technological 
actor.  
• One strategy that could be relevant for creating cyborg works would be to 
direct the entire production with only humans and then have the actors that 
played roles to be undertaken by technology, to work with the director to 
‘train’ the technology to play that role. This will assist both the technology’s 
presence and the actors to rehearse as they need to without interruption.  
Timing 
• Timing is critical to executing relationships between technology and human 
actors. The process I have used to direct works that incorporate technological 
actors is one in which all the blocking and timing is perfected prior to work 
on characterisation, dynamic and relationships. All the actors I have worked 
with have expressed that this is the opposite to what they are used to doing as 
actors, and they needed to shift their thinking about making the work in 
order to be able to do it. Once they understood what was required, generally 
they were happy to proceed but until they understood that this was required, 
they felt frustrated. To make cyborg theatre works, actors need to know that 
they will spend a significant amount of time locking in blocking and timing, 
and usually before anything else, without any concern for character or 
emotion, and once that is locked in they will need to use this as a ‘physical 
script’ for their explorations of character and dynamic. 
• If actors have time to work entirely as they normally would with just the 
director and fellow actors, then when the technology is brought in, set time 
would need to be taken to direct blocking and timing prior to proceeding.  
Directing reactions 
• Effectively manufacturing reaction is a key challenge of cyborg theatre. A 
common prerequisite for an acting agent that emerges within acting theory, 
puppetry and studies of autonomous agents is that it has the capacity to react. 
In order for a technology to be considered an actor, it must appear to have a 
spontaneous and present response, but does not need to be autonomous 
(contrary to Saltz’s view that media must be live). Technological actors are 
made to simulate reactions and emotion in the same way that the 
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performances of animals, puppets and ‘media actors’ are simulated by human 
construction. Rather than ‘acting’, technology simulates. In many ways 
technology in theatre naturally enforces demonstration rather than imitation, 
to use Brecht’s terms.  
• In order to simulate reaction and spontaneous, present responses, natural 
human responses and reactions must be found initially. The best method to 
do this is via a human actor.  
Human transference 
• Technological actors have the best chance at being perceived to be present 
when a ‘live’ actor is juxtaposed with a technological actor (as Nick Kaye 
intimates with reference to Supervision, mentioned in chapter two). In the case 
of the android performer in Sayonara by Seinenden Company, the android 
asked us to accept her as human in form, gesture and movement, and hence 
provided an example of ‘dumbing down the actor’, as Garry Stewart 
described his experience to me when working with technology and bodies in 
his show, Held.  
• The human actor must endow the technology as having presence, and 
perform through the machine. The cyborg is a hybrid – half human and half 
machine. In constructing a cyborg theatre, it is necessary that the humans 
transfer some of their humanness to the machine. This line of thinking mirrors 
those acting theories mentioned at the start of this study:  as Stanislavski 
argued, the actor “must fit his own human qualities to the life of this other 
person, and pour into it all of his own soul” (11-12). In a way, the technology 
and media becomes the ‘character’ which the actor ‘fills’ with her soul.  
Language 
• The current language of actor training is less adequate to describe cyborg 
theatre works than terminology evolving in computer science and AI studies. 
Drawing on the language used by technologists, we can begin to describe 
technology that acts in theatre. These terms are more useful than those such 
as body, spirit, consciousness and truth, which are used in human acting 
theories.  
• ‘Media actors’ is a general term that can be used to describe technology that 
acts (‘subject technology’). This can be further broken down into: 
1) Technological puppets, where the technology is operated by human agency;  
2) Technological performers, where the technology has autonomous agency but 
does not purport to signify anything other than itself; and  
3) Technological actors, where the technology is separate from human agency 
and makes autonomous choices.  
Technologically retrained actor bodies 
• The movement score of the actor’s body is impacted upon by the 
technology, given that the actor must be positioned specifically in relation 
to digital technologies. Actors I have worked with and actors in other case 
studies such as Supervision articulated that finding an internal truth based 
on an external given is reverse to a usual theatre creation process. 
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However, once actors understand this, they often find it quite liberating 
and that it can enable them to find an inner truth in a different way. 
Rather than inhibit, it can actually present a possibility.  
In this study I have sought to understand the practical implications of using 
technology as actor. I have made these discoveries that contribute to an emerging 
cyborg theatre dramaturgy.  
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CONCLUSION 
In this research, I have examined the strategies required for directors of cyborg 
theatre to employ when working with human and non-human actors. To assist this 
examination, I have explored how to animate non-human actors’ presence, how to 
animate human / non-human actor interactivity in rehearsals and performance, and 
how to deal with the atypical level of spontaneity in use of time, space, and 
relationships that the programming of non-human actors insert into the process of 
rehearsal and performance.  
In an age of increased engagement with digital technologies, it is inevitable that 
more and more theatre will incorporate robots, avatars and other interactive 
computer-based technologies to perform with human actors. I acknowledge that this 
challenges the auratic presence of human actors, but far from arguing against 
incorporation of these technologies, I offer new methods of theatre making strategies 
in order to enhance the humans’ auratic presence. While also acknowledging that 
‘live’ technologies are more amenable for actors to play with on stage, linear media 
(as defined by David Saltz) can also be given presence by the actors and director. 
This thesis is a preliminary step towards strategies for enabling liveness in cyborg 
theatre.  
This project has examined the way conceptions of theatrical presence are unsettled 
by cyborg theatre in order to overcome them. In this exegesis, I have located my 
research within a specific scholarly field with explicit reference to Jennifer Parker-
Starbuck’s writings on cyborg theatre, Cormac Power’s work on theatrical presence 
and Philip Auslander’s analysis of liveness. I have also analysed a series of landmark 
productions within the nascent genre of cyborg theatre with reference to the 
complex interactions between bodies and technologies. Finally, I have described 
how my creative work as a director has generated problems within this field for 
which I have found strategies, and I have conveyed this knowledge and experience 
through both the scholarly work articulated in this exegesis and through a series of 
creative works, including my examination performance, Cyborg No Exit. 
Jennifer Parker-Starbuck’s study is a seminal work that articulates a clear taxonomy 
and a framework for considering cyborg theatre; however, hers is primarily a 
scholarly work. My work adopts her taxonomy and applies it to the making of 
theatre, drawing on her concepts and language and then using them to construct 
work made on the floor. More importantly, I have used Parker-Starbuck’s notion of 
‘subject technology’ to rethink how technology might function as an actor, and to 
explore the increasingly porous boundaries between humans and machines. 
Creating theatre with technological and human actors is a nascent form of theatrical 
practice and one I envisage will grow. At this early stage, it is critical that in 
understanding the field, practitioners investigate the implications of the work in 
practice and, alongside scholars, articulate findings through both theory and 
practice.  
The methods I have used to develop new strategies for directing cyborg theatre are:   
1) my self-reflexive experience as a theatre director engaged in working with human 
and technological actors; 
  
2) interviews with key practitioners involved in the field of cyborg performance 
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practice 
  
3) my critical reading of the scholarly literature on the various relationships between 
live performance and technology with a focus on the work of Starbuck-Parker and 
Power; 
  
These three areas of inquiry inform my research findings with respect to the 
following question: what are the most effective pragmatic and philosophical strategies for 
developing a cyborg theatre dramaturgy? The formulation of such a dramaturgy makes 
an original contribution to knowledge by identifying key antinomies in the practice 
of cyborg theatre that directors involved in this form of theatre must negotiate. In 
general terms, then, this project is about the theory and practice of directing cyborg 
theatre.  
 
The study has revealed how a director can set up a live, augmented reality, and/or 
virtual reality stage; how the presence of non-human actors alters the space, time, 
and interactivity between agents on stage, and between those agents and the 
audience; how use of non-human actors can replicate a culture in which interaction 
via and with augmented and virtual reality technologies is becoming more and more 
ubiquitous;  and the demand on and strategies deployed by directors working with 
non-human actors. It has raised the question as to whether current computer and 
robotic technology is sophisticated enough at this stage to become more than a 
puppet animated by a human actor. Most importantly, the study has demonstrated 
how a range of computer-based robotic agents (projected alter egos, avatars, 
anthropomorphic robots, non-anthropomorphic robots) can be animated on a stage 
through a restructured rehearsal process, focus on timing, directing reactions, a new 
vocabulary and human transference as well as an acknowledgement that the actors’ 
body is retrained by technology. 
 
Little has been written about the experience of performers working with 
technological actors. Likewise, much has been written about puppetry and 
animating objects, but not about the challenges and considerations of making 
technological objects competent actors and the impact this has on human 
performers, especially in terms of what happens to actorly presence. While artists 
and scholars are becoming increasingly interested in digital performance and cyborg 
theatre, the scholarly writing in this area is almost exclusively presented from the 
point of view of what Susan Melrose calls the “expert spectator”. I have sought to 
present a practitioner’s perspective as a contribution to growing interest in this area.  
As a performance maker, the task of ‘expert spectating’ is problematic. It is very 
difficult to ask questions of performance without thinking about the outcome of the 
work. Intuition is key to expert practitioners’ modes of knowledge making and 
expert-intuition cannot be witnessed by expert-spectators, making it difficult to 
incorporate into the academy as valid knowledge making. Through my exegesis I 
have sought ways to articulate knowledge that I have gained intuitively through 
practical work, as recognised by Melrose.  
 
The novelty of my work lies in producing a practice-based dramaturgy that is 
sensitive to the nuances and complexities of how theatrical presence must be re-
thought with reference to technologies that act with humans. Through this study, I 
have gained a large amount of practical knowledge about working with technology 
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by making work, by interviewing other practitioners and interviewing the actors 
with whom I have worked. This exegesis and Cyborg No Exit present my discoveries, 
which I hope will be of use to other theatre practitioners grappling with the practical 
issues of integrating technological actors with human actors. I have also identified 
terms and concepts to be used to describe these theatre works, which will be useful 
for scholars writing about theatre productions that engage technology as actors.  
The very concept of a technological actor is one that I believe is novel to theatre 
practice. Even avant-garde and postdramatic works have rarely used technology as 
an actor. However, as technology continues to infiltrate every aspect of our lives and 
as robotics, especially, becomes more of an everyday phenomenon, it is inevitable 
that technology will become integrated into mainstream theatre practice – it already 
dominates the way ‘backstage’ production tasks are performed. The literal presence 
of digital technologies in theatre impacts upon the ‘making present’ of a fictional 
world. It also opens up complex levels of presence that are often masked in everyday 
life. We experience one another’s presence throughout a normal day in many ways: 
literally present with one another; present on the phone as a voice; as a thought in 
email; as an image on Skype, and so on.  
The implications of my study for future creative practice focus on the practical tasks 
of dramaturgical process, planning and methodology. Hopefully, actors will also 
gain productive insights into the challenges posed by cyborg theatre. The 
implications of my study for future scholarship lie in its elaboration of a nascent set 
of concepts and a critical vocabulary pertinent to the practice of cyborg theatre.  
The stage can be many things: a sacred space, a space for experimentation, the 
communication of conflict and emotion. It can also be the site of public humiliation 
and torture. The etymology of the word theatre tells us that it’s a place for looking, 
and this means that the judgmental gaze of the audience is trained on our activities 
as theatre practitioners. We live and die in the harsh light of the spectatorial gaze. 
My examination performance, Cyborg No Exit, ends with the performers trapped in a 
version of theatrical hell. Nothing is absolutely resolved since the play raises more 
questions than it answers. It is, in my view, the condition that frames creative work. 
Theatre practice is like housework. It never ends. We need to make and remake 
work in the light of never-ending political, economic, emotional, personal and 
technological transformations. This exegesis has hopefully conveyed the fact that 
there is always more work to be done in the face of technological innovation. I hope 
that other practitioners will use this study as a starting point to test these and their 
own strategies to create cyborg theatre works.  
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